Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa, in the aftermath of the Pacific war and post
occupation, been given a voice; or does the once independent
kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?
Alexandra Jane Corrin

The Battle of Okinawa
Shame yourselves not!
You must die!
Give us handgrenades
Use your sickles, your hoes, your razorsKill! Die!
Parent to child, husband to wife, young to old
The emerald green sea to crimson
Called mass suicide
In truth, a hands-off mass murder
Iri Maruki and Toshi Maruki, Okinawa: A Portrait of War
(1982-1992)

”Okinawa no mondai”, the Okinawa problem, is a phrase with which,
having resided in Japan for a decade, I am familiar. But to what
does this refer? For most Japanese it is synonymous with “kichi no
mondai”, the base problem: the opposition towards the 74.8 percent
of U.S military bases on just 0.6 percent of Japan’s territory (Hook
and Siddle, 2003). These occupy close to 20 percent of the main
island (Taira 1997), are a perpetual physical legacy of the Battle of
Okinawa, and a bitter reminder of Okinawa’s tripartite relationship,
with Japan and the U.S. The phrase “Okinawa no mondai” also

1

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

connotates the specifically Okinawan nature of the problem: it is a
problem with which mainland Japanese, 330 miles away, need not,
and want not, to be concerned. The Okinawan problem is
multifarious, involving Okinawa’s historical legacies, the
appropriation of history for political purposes (see Hein and Selden
1997,2000, for a detailed exploration of this theme), the education
system, issues of constitutional rights, of cultural and political
identity, as well as economic, and environmental factors. What is
more, it is debatable as to whether we may even speak of Okinawa
in terms of a monolithic, homogenous entity, for while the inhabitants
of Okinawa prefecture include the numerous Filipinos, Indians and
even ex- U. S servicemen who have settled in Okinawa, should we
also count those “Okinawan” communities born in Kansai and
elsewhere? (Hook and Siddle, 2003).
Furthermore, Okinawa, including the outlying islands of the
archipelago, with their own distinct local rituals and practices, boasts
a rich cultural diversity. Moreover, main- island Okinawans may
even exclude the outlying islanders of Miyako, as historically and
culturally different, or even regard them as inferior (Hook and Siddle,
2003). In fact, even the Okinawan mainland residents’ attitudes
towards Japan, the U.S, and the base issue, are divided (Siddle
1998).
In a dynamic changing global environment Okinawa’s identity is, in
Siddle and Hook’s words, under constant ”renegotiation”. This paper
seeks to decide whether Okinawa, during the post occupation years,
is phoenix or underdog.
In order to come closer to our objective, let us first put Okinawa into
its historical context. The Okinawan archipelago, previously the
independent Ryukyu kingdom, was annexed to Japan, in 1879(see
Taira 1997 for the origins of Okinawa prefecture). These beginnings,
and Okinawa’s subsequent relations with Japan, have meant that
Okinawan history is often framed as a “narrative of victimization”.
Hook and Siddle elaborate:

This dominant narrative of Okinawan victimization begins with the
Satsuma invasion of 1609 and is punctuated with keywords like

2

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

Ryukyu shobun, sotetsu jigoku (palm-tree hell-the starvation period
of the 1920s), tetsu no arashi (the Typhoon of Steel-Battle of
Okinawa) and fukki (reversion). It culminates in the kichi mondai
(base issue) and Okinawa’s unfair treatment at the hands of the
central government.
(Hook and Siddle, Japan and Okinawa: Introduction 2003:11)

Himeyuri no tou: a symbol of Okinawan sacrifice (Photo by author)

This narrative of victimization continues to be reiterated in
conjunction with certain incidents. Thus, the Himeyuri, high school
student nurses Corps, killed on the battlefield in 1945, have become
symbols of Okinawa’s sacrifice. And the 1995 rape of a schoolgirl,
by the U.S military has, as Angst convincingly shows, been
appropriated as a metaphor for the violation of Okinawan territorial
and political autonomy (Angst, 2001). Okinawa, in this way, has
come to be epitomized by the gendered metaphor of the sacrificed
daughter. In fact Takazato Suzuyo, leader of the Okinawan
delegation to the 1995 Women’s conference in Beijing even
declared:
Okinawa is the prostituted daughter of Japan. Japan used her as a
breakwater to keep the battlefields from spreading over the
mainland until the end of World War 11. After the war, she enjoyed
economic prosperity by selling the daughter to the United States.

3

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

(Quoted in Angst 2001: 251)
However, though persuasive, the narrative of victimization allows no
place for Okinawan agency, implying that the Okinawans
themselves had no influence in shaping their own destinies. Reality
is much more complex, particularly when it comes to the area of
commemorating and memorializing emotive historical events, the
politicization of history, and the problems of putting history into the
public domain (Figal 2001, Yonetani 2000, 2003,Yoneyama 1999).
This tension begins with the Battle of Okinawa: the only ground war
fought on Japanese soil in 1945 and involving civilians. During this
encounter close to one third of the local population were annihilated
and a total of about 147,000 died (Hein, 2001). Twice as many
civilians were killed as troops (Allen 2002:33, see also Ota 1981and
Ota 1999 for full exposition of civilian casualties).
Different versions of the truth, in relation to the Battle of Okinawa,
have been a source of acrimony regarding the displays of the
Yaeyama Peace Memorial Museum, which opened in 1999, on the
southern island of Ishigaki, and the New Peace Memorial Museum,
which opened in 2000, in Mabuni, mainland Okinawa. Surreptitious
changes to museum exhibits, by the prefectural administration
(Yonetani 2000 and Yonetani 2003), were, put bluntly, deliberate
attempts at historical falsification.
Within the climate of a growing nationalistic historical revisionist
movement within Japan, the tampering with both displays reflected
efforts to downplay the Japanese Imperial Army’s atrocities against
Okinawan civilians. In June 1999 exhibits of the Yaeyama Peace
Memorial museum, underwent a number of clandestine changes.
The museum, originally intended to commemorate victims of ‘war
malaria’: local inhabitants who had contracted the virus after being
expelled to malaria-infested areas by the Japanese army, had its
captions euphemistically doctored. Thus, “forced expulsion” was
changed to: ”ordered to take refuge”, and a panel thought to depict
suicide, became simply ” victims of the Battle of Okinawa” (Yonetani
2003:196).

4

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

Similarly, in August 2000, local newspapers revealed that the
prefectural administration had interfered with displays of the
Okinawa Prefectural peace museum. The conservative governor,
Inamine, proclaimed that exhibits: ’should not be too anti-Japanese’
as Okinawa ‘only amounts to one prefecture within Japan’. The
controversy centred upon a life-sized diorama depicting enforced or
so called ‘collective’ suicide within a recreated scene of a cave. The
diorama was to portray a Japanese soldier pointing his rifle at an
Okinawan mother and ordering her to kill her baby, because the
baby’s cries might be heard by the invading US military. However,
while visiting the workshop, on the eve of the outbreak of the
revelations over the attempted changes, a supervisory committee
found that the soldier no longer had a rifle, but was merely staring at
the family hiding in the cave. Nevertheless, in the face of public
outrage and extensive press coverage the gun was reinstated, albeit
no longer pointing directly at the mother. Furthermore, the people of
Okinawa showed irrepressible interest in their history, through
numerous contributions to newspapers and, in the first two weeks of
opening, the new Prefectural Peace memorial Museum achieved
twice the average annual visitors of its predecessor (Yonetani, 2003).

The new prefectural peace museum: a site for learning about the Battle of Okinawa (Photo by author).

Not only have many community members, in these ways, fought for
an honest portrayal of their history, but there have also been several
outstanding individual voices and local initiatives, seeking to re appropriate their history. Among these is Mr. Sakima, the curator of

5

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

Sakima bejitsukan, or art museum, whom I met during August 2002.
Displaying Iri and Toshi Maruki’s huge murals depicting the horror
and human carnage of the Battle of Okinawa, these paintings reveal
to students visiting the small but busy private museum, the full
extent of the army’s atrocities. They learn that, in Iri’s words:
Group suicide is a masquerade because even though people were
not physically killed they were forced to kill themselves.
(Maruki Iri quoted from Marukis’ documentary, 1984).

The author with Mr. Sakima, August 2002 (Photo by author)

Just as the portrayals of group suicides in museum displays and
captions were highly contested, the semantics of history are also
being fought over in another public domain: Japanese history
textbooks. The issue of the wording used to describe suicides has
been a vitriolic one. It erupted in the early 1980s, when the
Japanese Education ministry’s insistence that the phrase “Shudan
Jiketsu”, “group suicide”, should be used in Ienaga Saburo’s
textbook was strongly, but unsuccessfully, protested by
Okinawans. ”Jiketsu” connotates honour, glory, and voluntary self sacrifice for the greater good (for a comprehensive analysis of the
phrase see Taira 1999 and Field 1991). A ruling by the Supreme
Court, insisting on its inclusion has only exacerbated the perception
gap between Japanese and Okinawans, about the war. Norma Field,

6

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

in her book In the Realm of a Dying Emperor, gives a useful account
of the semantics of shudan jiketsu:
The neutral translation .. might be ‘collective suicide’. In this instance,
the neutral choice is inadequate. For if the end of life was ‘self
determined’,..the determination was made under duress, both in the
form of the presence of the two armies and in the long discipline
required for the production of Japanese Imperial subjects. For this
reason I think of shudan jiketsu as ’compulsory group suicide
Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor (1991:61)
A further concern of activists has been that of what message is
passed on to future generations. Kinjo Shigeaki, a professor of
Ryukyu University, in Okinawa, states:
In Germany the children are taught about what the Nazis did and to
resist if the government should become like Nazis. But in Japan
people grow up thinking that the army didn’t do anything wrong and
are not told the truth about Okinawa.
(Kinjo Shigeaki, quoted from Marukis’ documentary, 1984).
One way in which children can learn however, is through illustrated
children’s books by the Marukis, which tell frankly the story of the
battle. For example, their book Okinawa: The Cry of an Island tells
vividly how locals were brutally forced out of their places of shelter,
by the Japanese army. And the paranoia and discriminatory
attitudes of the army is also made abundantly clear:
In Megushima, Gu san was killed by the Japanese army. His wife
and five children were also killed. They said that because they were
from Korea they were likely to be spies. Many residents of the island
who were not supportive to the Imperial Army were also killed.
(Maruki, I and Maruki, T., Okinawa: Sen no Zu, 2000 translated from
the Japanese by the author.)
The Marukis' contribution has been immense, as is emphasized in
John Dower's tribute:

7

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

Historical memory is fickle and the influence of powerful visual
images is incalculable. Much of what the Marukis painted might well
be nearly forgotten already if they had not given us such strong
images to hold onto… and a reminder of Okinawa, where Japanese
soldiers killed their own countrymen before killing themselves. When
the images are offered with a sense of tragedy and complexity as
well as anger, as Iri and Toshi Maruki have done, the historic
memory has been well served (Dower, 1985,26).

At a regional level local initiatives have also been taken to
“resurrect” the past and to educate children. Kumejima Island’s
Board of Education, in 1999, introduced a new “living history”
program, to present to students the stories of survivors of the Pacific
war. This served, in Matthew Allen’s words, to ”provide
counternarratives to those sponsored by the ministry of education”
(Allen 2002:27) since, for the most part, the Kumejima massacres
have been omitted from the historical record available to school
children. In terms of education, a more fundamental problem facing
Okinawans is that their curriculum is imposed by mainland Japan.
The centralized education policy discriminates against Okinawan
children because the compulsory Japanese history and culture
books largely ignore the existence of Okinawa. Sakuda Isamu, from
the Kumejima Board of Education, laments:
The biggest problem we face is that of the ministry of education. It
looks to standardize its curriculum without any recognition of
regional or cultural difference. So the kids down here learn about
Kansai, Kanto and Kinki Japanese history, but nothing at all about
local culture and history. . It’s a travesty.
Quoted in Allen (2002:124)
That said, nevertheless, a number of well-known Kume people have
successfully become part of a wider Okinawan community, such as
Ota Masahide, the former governor of Okinawa prefecture and
professor emeritus at the University of the Ryukyus (see Ota 1981,
1991, 1999, 2003).

8

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

In addition to the subordination of Okinawan education to the
centralized mainland monkasho, another fundamental structural
problem preventing Okinawans from achieving a greater degree of
autonomy lies in a strong economic dependence upon mainland
Japan. This is a key issue which goes hand in hand with politics, the
government’s policy towards Okinawa is essentially a “stick and
carrot” one: harsh suppression of opposition in exchange for
financial dividends (Ota 2003). The most glaring example was when,
in 1999, the central government pledged to renew negotiations over
large-scale economic stimulus packages for Japan’s poorest
prefecture -with per capita income at 70% of the national average
(Taira 1999:171). In return, Inamine was put under intense pressure
to secure a site for the building of a new controversial US military
base in Nago to take over the functions of the US Marine Corps Air
Station at Futenma. Significantly, although Okinawans did, in spite
of the ”carrot”, in a plebiscite on the issue register their opposition to
the relocation, ultimately their constitutional rights were ignored, and
more money dispensed to ostracize opponents (Yonetani 2001).
Okinawa is often referred to as a “3K” economy-bases (kichi), public
works (kokyo koji) and tourism (kanko) (McCormack, 2003). The
base issue is a dichotomous one: in conjunction with those
Okinawans protesting the bases there are also those who have a
vested interest in maintaining them. Thus, in March 1995, while
3000 opposed the occupation of their land and refused to accept the
payments, 29,564 Okinawans received the payments without protest.
Moreover, many of those refusing were not Okinawans, but
outsiders, who own tiny plots under the hitotsubo anti-war
landowners’ movement (Hook and Siddle 2003). In addition, the
pernicious effects of the 39 military bases on Okinawa island alone
may be offset against the employment opportunities created,
although the revenue from U.S bases as a percentage of local GDP
has fallen from 25.6%, in 1970, to just 5.7%, in 1996 (Hook and
Siddle 2003:5). Ultimately, the positive aspects of the bases are
eclipsed by the negative ones.
Construction, or public works, also constitutes a double-edged
sword: while infrastructure has been dramatically improved since
reversion, compounded by tourism, the two make a toxic cocktail of

9

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

environmental damage (for a thorough analysis of economic and
environmental issues see McCormack, 2003).
As well as its ecological ramifications mainland images of
Okinawans, as promulgated in advertising Okinawa as a resort, may
be seen as an encroachment on Okinawan cultural identity.
Okinawans are frequently constructed as the exotic other (Hook and
Siddle 2003:6), perpetuating gross stereotypes and undermining
Okinawa’s cultural diversity. Moreover, many resorts, catering to
homeland tastes, do not even serve Okinawan food, import
souvenirs from the mainland, and, employing more mainlanders
than Okinawans, often enhance not Okinawan, but mainland coffers.
Yet, despite the structural limitations on Okinawa, it nevertheless
remains true that Okinawa's status has improved immensely since
reversion. Okinawans now have more rights than they did prereversion, and, in the area of memorialisation of the past in
particular, a large degree of autonomy from the official state
sponsored version of history, has been achieved. Even with its
limitations, the prefectural peace museum is unprecedented in what
it set out to achieve, and perhaps the only museum to scrutinize the
behaviour of Imperial troops and avoid the” victim consciousness” or
“higaisha ishiki” that Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been accused of
(see Orr, 2001). Still more, the museum, with its traditional
Okinawan-style architecture, while a symbol of pride in Okinawan
culture simultaneously is unique in its transnationalization of peace
through the Cornerstone of peace monument. This lists the names
of the victims of the Battle of Okinawa, regardless of their nationality,
rank or status as civilian or combatant (see Figal 2001 for an
analysis of this memorial). Despite accusations of “Yasukunification”,
it is in fact diametrically opposed to the nationalistic narrative of war
glorification, offered at that site.

10

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

The Cornerstone of Peace Monument, Mabuni in 2002 (Photo by author)

Moreover, in terms of establishing a cultural identity and gaining
increased respect from the mainland, significant inroads have been
made (Amemiya 1999). Siddle and Hook even suggest that: “a
counter-colonization of Japanese cultural space by Okinawan
cultural forms is occurring” (Hook and Siddle, 2003:14) citing the
popularity of music and Okinawan cookery programmes as
examples. Indeed, in 2007,young Okinawan singer, Natsukawa Rimi,
idolized by many Japanese, is a staple at karaoke evenings.
To conclude, Okinawa has resurged, repeatedly, from hardships of
the past, and, in spite of the inherent structural hurdles of the
political, economical and education systems, the voice of Okinawa
grows. Remarkable gains have been accomplished and strong
stances taken. If the base issue, in the present post September 11 th
world situation, looks bleak, Okinawans continue to display a
determined vitality. Okinawa can therefore be seen, depending on
the historical time and place, as both phoenix and underdog,
perhaps perpetually swinging between the two. The spirit of
Okinawa however is resoundingly that of a phoenix, constantly
resurging. Okinawans are securing the best deal they can for
themselves, within permanent, but often redefined, perimeters.
Active participants in their future, constantly renegotiating their
position within Japan, Okinawans are, in Hook and Siddle’s phrase:
“taking advantage of the contradictory opportunities inherent in the
structural constraints upon their lives” Hook and Siddle (2003: 241).

11

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

.

REFERENCES

Allen, M. (2002) Identity and Resistance In Okinawa, Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Amemiya, K. (1999) ‘ Being “Japanese” in Brazil and Okinawa’, in C.
Johnson (ed.) Okinawa: Cold War island, Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy
Research Institute.
Angst, L. (2001) ‘The Sacrifice of a Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case,
Discourses of Power, and Women’s Lives in Okinawa’, in Critical
Asian Studies 32, 2: 243-266.
Dower, J. and Junkerman, J. (eds.) (1985) The Hiroshima Murals:
The Art of Iri Maruki and Toshi Maruki, Tokyo, New York and San
Francisco: Kodansha International Ltd.
Field, N. (1991) In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at
century’s end, New York: Pantheon.
Figal, G. (1997) ‘Waging peace on Okinawa’, Critical Asian Studies
33,1:37-69.
Francis, C. (1999) ‘Women and Military Violence’, in C. Johnson
(ed.) Okinawa: Cold War island, Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research
Institute.
Fujitani, T., White, G. and Yoneyama, L. (eds.) (2001) Perilous
Memories: the Asia-Pacific War(s), Durham and London: Duke
University Press.
Hein, L. and Selden, M. (eds.) (1997) Living with the Bomb:
American and Japanese cultural conflicts in the nuclear age, New
York and London: M.E. Sharpe.

12

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

--(2000) Censoring History: citizenship and memory in Japan,
Germany and the United States, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
Hein, L. (2001) ‘Introduction: the territory of identity and
remembrance in Okinawa’, Critical Asian Studies 33,1: 31-6.
Hook, G. (2003) ‘Responding to globalization: Okinawa’s Free Trade
Zone in micro regional context, in Hook, G. and Siddle, R. (eds.)
Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity, London and New
York: Routledge Curzon.
Hook, G. and Siddle, R. (2003) ‘ Introduction: Japan? Structure and
subjectivity in Okinawa’, in Hook, G. and Siddle, R. (eds.)
Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity, London and New
York: Routledge Curzon.
-- (2003) ‘ Conclusion: both structure and subjectivity’, in Hook, G.
and Siddle, R. (eds.) Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity,
London and New York: Routledge Curzon.
Keyso, R. A. (2000) Women of Okinawa: Nine Voices from a
Garrison Island, Cornell University Press: Cornell Paperbacks.
Maruki, I. and Maruki, T. (1982-1992) Okinawa: Sen no Zu
(Okinawa: A Portrait of War), Okinawa: Sakima Art Museum.
-- (1982-1992) Documentary video Okinawa: Sen no Zu (Okinawa: A
Portrait of War), Okinawa: Sakima Art Museum.
-- (2000) Okinawa Shima no Koe (The Cry of Okinawa Island),
Tokyo: Komineshoten.
McCormack, G. (2003) ‘Okinawa and the structure of dependence’,
in Hook, G. and Siddle, R. (eds.) Japan and Okinawa Structure and
subjectivity, London and New York: Routledge Curzon.
Orr, J. (2001), The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National
Identity in Postwar Japan, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

13

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

Ota. M. (1981) This Was the Battle of Okinawa, Okinawa: Naha
publishing Co.
--(1991) Genocide, Naha City: Okinawa Times Co., Ltd.
-- (1999) ‘ Re-Examining The History of The Battle of
Okinawa’, in Johnson, C. (ed.) Okinawa: Cold War island, Cardiff,
CA: Japan Policy Research Institute.
-- (2003) ‘Beyond hondo: devolution and Okinawa’, in Hook, G. and
Siddle, R. (eds.) Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity,
London and New York: Routledge Curzon.
Rabson, S. (1999) ‘Assimilation Policy In Okinawa: Promotion,
Resistance, And “Reconstruction”’, in C. Johnson (ed.) Okinawa:
Cold War island, Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute.
Saburo, I. (2001) Japan’s Past Japan’s Future: One Historian’s
Odyssey, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Siddle, R. (1998) ‘Colonialism and Identity in Okinawa before 1945’,
Japanese Studies 18, 2: 117-133.
Siddle, R. (2003) ‘ Return to Uchina: the politics of identity in
contemporary Okinawa’, in Hook, G. and Siddle, R. (eds.)
Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity, London and New
York: Routledge Curzon.
Taira, K. (1997) ‘Troubled national identity: The Ryukuans/
Okinawans’ in Weiner, M. (ed.) Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of
homogeneity, London: Routledge.
-- (1999) ‘The Battle of Okinawa in Japanese history books’, in C.
Johnson (ed.) Okinawa: Cold War island, Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy
Research Institute.
--(1999) ‘Okinawa’s Choice: Independence or Subordination’, in C.
Johnson (ed.) Okinawa: Cold War island, Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy
Research Institute.

14

Phoenix or Perennial Underdog:
Has Okinawa in the aftermath of the Pacific War and post U.S. occupation, been given a voice; or does
the once independent kingdom now capitulate to the political volition of mainland Japan?

Alexandra Jane Corrin

Yonetani, J. (2000) ‘ On the Battlefield of Mabuni: Struggles over
Peace and the Past in Contemporary Okinawa’, East Asian History
20, 145-168.
--(2001) ‘Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater:
Futenma Relocation, the G-8 Summit, and Okinawa, in Critical Asian
Studies, 33:1, 70-95.
-- (2003) ‘Contested memories: struggles over war and peace in
contemporary Okinawa’, in Hook, G. and Siddle, R. (eds.)
Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity, London and New
York: Routledge Curzon.
Yoneyama, L. (1999) Hiroshima Traces: time, space and the
dialectics of memory, Berkley, Los Angeles and London: University
of California Press.

15