


NINO PASTI:

*EURO-MISSILES
AND THE
GENERAL
BALANCE
OF NATO AND
WARSAW PACT
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FROM THE PUBLISHER

When Senator Nino Pasti retired from Nato in 1969, he was a general, Allied Supreme Vice-Commander in Europe for Nuclear Affairs — after a brilliant career in the Italian air force.

In 1968 he wrote in *NATO Fifteen Nations* (February — March issue):

"Moreover, a reduction in the number of tactical weapons in Europe would have favourable political repercussions."

This realisation by **Nato General Nino Pasti** became the guideline of **Senator Nino Pasti's** life after retirement.

Nino Pasti is an Independent Left Member of the Senate of the Italian Republic, elected in June 1976 and re-elected in 1979.

We are very grateful to Senator Pasti for making available to us the vast wealth of information contained in his important speech before the Italian Senate on 10 December 1979 and in additional material, all published in this brochure.

Senator Pasti does not limit his activities to the confines of the Senate Chamber. He is a tireless activist in the world-wide mass movement against the preparations for war, a sought-after speaker at demonstrations, meetings and conferences in many parts of the world.

As Senator Pasti put it himself:

"I want to spend the rest of my life contributing to ensure peace in the world, so that my grandchildren may live."

INTRODUCTION

ESTIMATE OF THE ARMED FORCES – NATO – WARSAW PACT

1. The estimate of the opposing forces of the two military blocs has a decisive bearing on decisions of military and foreign policy of the allied and indeed of all nations. If in fact it were true that the Soviet Union disposes of far greater forces than would be needed for its defence and continues to acquire more arms, then it would be correct for NATO to pose the question of the reason for this alleged arms build-up and to examine, within this context, the actions undertaken by the Soviet Union in order to respond with adequate reactions. But if on the other hand the contrary were true, namely that the hostile forces threatening the Soviet Union (NATO in Europe and China in Asia, leaving aside Japan and all the other U.S. allies in Asia and the Pacific) are considerably stronger than the Soviet forces, then all the ideas which I expressed above must be completely reversed.

Modern technology provides means which make it possible to gain a complete and correct picture of the quantity and quality of the armed forces of any nation: this is done through the use of observation satellites and highly sophisticated equipment installed on ships and on the ground. However, the construction, maintenance and operation of these means require multi-billion dollar budgets. Only the intelligence services of the United States and the Soviet Union dispose of such budgets and thus of

the corresponding means of information. This means that there is no autonomous and independent agency or institute which would be in the position to remain up-to-date regarding the armed forces of the different nations and to check the information necessarily and exclusively provided by the intelligence services of the two super-powers. Yet, owing to a strange mental orientation, the West maintains, without any in-depth examination, that all information of Soviet origin is propaganda in the derogatory sense of the word, while all information from U.S. sources is nothing but gospel truth. The U.S. intelligence service can calmly – either directly or through the obliging information media of other countries – propagate those new items which are best suited to serve U.S. domestic and foreign policy. It is dangerously gullible to assume that this news is correct and reflects a true picture of the Warsaw Pact Forces.

Unfortunately it is this culpable gullibility – not to qualify it in stronger and perhaps more appropriate terms – which guides the governments of NATO countries when making their domestic and foreign policy decisions, decisions which compromise detente and the security and peace of the world.

Only a thorough and in-depth technico-military study of official NATO documentation can lead to a correction – at least in part – of the erroneous propagandistic estimate put out by the Western world. This is what I did in a speech in the Senate on 10 December last, in the course of which I cited 56 quotations taken from official allied and U.S. documents.

2. I thought it useful to submit to the Senate the entire documentation quoted in my speech, with a

view to putting it at the disposal of those colleagues who might be interested in a more thorough examination of this vital problem and also to avoid the repetition of petty articles in newspapers — some of which are even considered serious papers — which since they lack any real arguments to refute my documented statements, counter with insinuations, slander, lies.

One of the favourite arguments used for such insinuations, which ought to disqualify any serious journalist, is the fact that I belonged to the highest command echelon of NATO. I should like at this point to state that in an article published by the **NATO Fifteen Nations** magazine of February–March 1968, when I was Allied Supreme Vice-Commander in Europe for Nuclear Affairs, I wrote: "I think that there are too many of these weapons (tactical nuclear weapons) deployed in Europe today and that such a great number may give both sides the impression that we will use a vast quantity of these weapons before taking the final step: the use of strategic weapons. This would constitute a danger because tactical weapons would destroy Europe on either side of the iron curtain, but not Russia. Moreover, a reduction of the number of tactical weapons in Europe would have favourable political repercussions." And further: "Militarily speaking, it is doubtful that the Russians could achieve a rapid local success in any part of NATO, except in very insignificant dimensions."

But apart from personal considerations, this article, published in a NATO periodical, shows that Atlantic solidarity should be understood not as a supine and servile acceptance of U.S. theses but as an efficient labour of proposals and discussions which take into account the interests of the entire Atlantic community in Europe and in America. The

example given at present by Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium, all of them nations with unquestionable and profound Atlantic faith, constitutes an irrefutable demonstration.

3. The following text was prepared by me for my intervention. Its length, despite the "extra-time" allotted to me by the President of the Senate and the President of the Council, as shown by the text itself, obliged me to reduce certain parts of it which were less directly linked with Euro-missiles. Nevertheless I think that an unabridged reproduction will facilitate the reader's comprehension.

In his reply, the President of the Council was unable to contest any one of my documented statements.

Rome, 10 December 1979

Senator Nino Pasti

THE DANGEROUS INVOLUTION OF U.S. MILITARY POLICY

Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Government,
Distinguished Colleagues,

We are all aware of the gravity of the decision which we shall have to make, inasmuch as it might tip the scales which could determine Europe's choice between peace and a nuclear holocaust; a decision which is all the more grave because it is being taken on the basis of total ignorance of the reality of the problem and of the official documentation of the United States and NATO. It is a decision which is being taken, on the crest of a wave of frenetic and untrue propaganda, orchestrated by the most extremist U.S. circles.

With a view to combat this propaganda, which is extremely dangerous for Italy, for Europe and for the world, I have brought here a very voluminous official U.S. and NATO documentation which I shall quote in the course of my intervention. And with regard to the American warmongering propaganda, I think that the best starting point for a concrete and constructive speech on the Euro-missiles is Kissinger's declaration, which found a vast echo among those of our leaders who are always ready to accept without questioning any thesis of foreign ex-stars. Kissinger said that with practical parity in strategic nuclear weapons between the United States

and the Soviet Union, America would not risk the destruction of its territory in order to defend Europe and that, therefore, Europe must possess, on its own territory, the arms necessary for its defence.

Like all declarations of skilful politicians, this declaration contains 50 per cent truth and 50 per cent falsehood, and the conclusion is entirely incorrect. On 8 October 1973, when Kissinger was Secretary of State and was staking his personal political fortune on SALT I, on detente and reduction of armaments, he declared: "Once sufficiency is reached, additional increments of power do not translate into usable political strength, and attempts to achieve tactical gains can lead to cataclysm." (1)

This, incidentally, was the official policy, illustrated by Nixon when he presented U.S. foreign and military policy to Congress on 3 March 1973: "The classical concept of the balance of power included continual manoeuvring for marginal advantages over others. In the nuclear era this is both unrealistic and dangerous. It is unrealistic because when both sides possess such enormous power, small additional increments cannot be translated into tangible advantage or even usable political strength. And it is dangerous because attempts to seek tactical gains might lead to a confrontation which could be catastrophic." (2) This was the military and foreign policy which was pursued by the United States for ten years with optimal results for the entire world. Its inception can easily be situated: it was the moment of the Cuban missile crisis in October/November 1962. Cuba certainly did not have nuclear parity with the United States, when in April 1961 it was attacked by forces trained, supported and armed by the U.S.

Nuclear missiles capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union were already deployed in European NATO countries, and the Soviet missiles which were to be deployed in Cuba had the same tasks as the U.S. missiles deployed in Europe. Nevertheless, in my opinion it was justifiable that the deployment of nuclear weapons in Cuba, capable of striking at a large area of U.S. territory, was regarded as provocative and threatening. It was thanks to the political wisdom of Kennedy and Krushchov that a head-on confrontation which would have been disastrous for both sides was avoided; the strategic weapons at that time already in the possession of the two big powers were so terrible that their use would have led to reciprocal suicide. Thus, being no longer in a position to fight directly, the United States and the Soviet Union had of necessity to coexist.

I should like to invite all those who are interested in questions of peace to read President Kennedy's speech at Washington University on 10 June 1963, which constitutes a spiritual testament. As everyone knows, he was assassinated in November of that year. Kennedy urged the American people to undertake some self-criticism, to recognise their responsibility in the cold war and in the treatment meted out to the Soviet Union. This speech ought to be repeated today, because it is more topical than ever. Permit me to quote only one paragraph: "I have, therefore, chosen this time and this place to discuss a topic, in which ignorance too often abounds and truth is too rarely perceived; yet it is the most important topic on earth: world peace. What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a *pax americana* enforced on the world by American weapons of war, not a peace of the grave or the security of the slave."(3)

The consequences of agreements which followed the Cuba conference were important and manifold. With regard to nuclear weapons, these were not to be deployed on the island, and simultaneously missiles with the capacity of hitting the Soviet Union were withdrawn from Europe. Moreover, the difference between tactical (theatre) and strategic weapons became much more clearly defined; strategic weapons are those which can strike the two powers; theatre weapons are those which cannot strike the two powers but whose range is limited only — and I underline only — to the European allies.

The Jupiter medium-range missiles deployed in Italy and Turkey at the end of the '50s merit a special commentary. The decision regarding their deployment was taken during a troubled NATO summit meeting, the first summit meeting of the Alliance, held in Paris in December 1957. With the launching of *Sputnik* one and two, on 4 October and 3 November respectively, the Soviet Union had proved that it was capable of building inter-continental missiles, whereas the United States was not yet capable of building similar missiles. The strategic balance was, or seemed to be, upset in favour of the Soviet Union. It became, therefore, necessary to re-establish it by deploying in Europe the only U.S. medium-range missiles which were not capable of striking the Soviet Union from U.S. territory. With the construction of U.S. inter-continental missiles the balance was re-established and the Jupiter missiles were withdrawn without causing any imbalance. Today, as I shall show in my presentation, the U.S. has a considerable nuclear superiority with regard to strategic as well as theatre weapons; the deployment of the Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles would be dangerous and provocative, just as the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba

would have been. Soviet reaction is certainly not more serious nor more weighty than that of NATO as a consequence of **Sputnik** and the Cuban missiles crisis and is equally justified. And as a final consideration: with the Jupiter missiles Italy really had a "second key" and the missiles could not be used without our explicit agreement. The need for Italian agreement to use these weapons necessary for maintaining the strategic balance between the two powers obviously conferred on Italy an appreciable political importance. As far as nuclear problems are concerned, — and not only nuclear ones — our country today is reduced to the level of a U.S. colonial possession, as the following example will show.

Until 1973 the need for U.S. strategic weapons was determined by the strategy established at that time by the U.S. Secretary for Defence McNamara when he presented the defence budget for 1969. This strategy which denotes with the term strategy against cities either strategy of minimum assured destruction or of deterrent, was defined in the following way: "...an ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor or combination of aggressors even after absorbing a surprise attack".(4)

"In the case of the Soviet Union, I — it is McNamara who is speaking — I would judge that a capacity on our part to destroy say one-fifth to one-fourth of her population and one-half of her industrial capacity would serve as an efficient deterrent."(5) Still according to McNamara, 400 nuclear warheads capable of surviving a surprise attack would have been sufficient to constitute a deterrent, a credible dissuasion.(6)

McNamara's strategy which, I repeat, persisted for ten years, confirming its full efficacy and at the same time favouring détente and collaboration between East and West, had very important advantages: it was purely defensive, it eliminated every possibility of a reciprocally suicidal war and at the same time required relatively few strategic forces.

In 1973 Nixon was submerged by the Watergate scandal, and with a — per force — much less powerful Kissinger, new vistas opened up for the most extremist U.S. circles. Their drum-major was Schlesinger — at that time Secretary for Defence and a personal enemy of Kissinger — who said at a press conference on 30 November 1973 in the Pentagon in an indirect reply to Nixon:

"If the strategy which is chosen is a minimum assured destruction, then sufficiency represents a relatively small force structure. If sufficiency represents the way I attempted to treat equality, it represents a much larger strategic force structure"(7).

At that time the arms race, prompted by the United States, began and it continues to this day. A comparison between the defence budget for 1974, presented by the then Secretary of Defence Richardson and the one for 1975, one year later, presented by Schlesinger, is significant. Richardson, proud of the many reductions achieved in all sectors of the American armed forces, said: "In short, in the fiscal year 1974 the defence share of the total federal spending, the total net public spending, the total labour force and the gross national product would be the smallest in nearly a quarter of a century."(8)

When presenting the budget for 1975, Schlesinger, after having qualified massive reprisals

against cities as "rhetorical", pointed out: "...that targets for nuclear weapons may also include not only cities and silos (of strategic missiles) but also airfields and a variety of other important assets that are not necessarily collocated with urban population".(9)

The strategic forces considered sufficient in the framework of the strategy against cities came to be judged by Schlesinger as only a modest component of the U.S. strategic forces necessary for a counter-force strategy. Naturally, the new counter-force strategy had enormously increased the number of strategic nuclear weapons needed for its implementation.

The following year, by now certain of being firmly in the saddle, Schlesinger pointed out, when presenting the 1976 budget that dissuasion was nothing but "a dangerous illusion"(10) and that "more recently illusions somewhat similar to those of the fifties regarding deterrence have emerged about detente".(11)

Thus finished the era of "illusions" about dissuasion and detente which had produced so many important and significant agreements between East and West — 82 between 1963 and 1973, listed by Senator Mike Mansfield in the U.S. Senate — (12) the road towards a return to the cold war, a return which was necessary to justify the American arms race, lay open.

Schlesinger found active successors. Rumsfeld who was at that time Secretary of Defence stated, when presenting the budget for 1978: "The present planning objective of the Defence Department is clear. We believe that a substantial number of military forces and critical industries in the Soviet

Union should be directly targeted and that an important objective of the assured retaliation mission should be to retard significantly the ability of the USSR to recover from a nuclear exchange and regain the status of a 20th-century military and industrial power more rapidly than the United States."(13) In other words, the strategical superiority of the United States must allow it to wage and win a strategic nuclear war impeding the resurgence of the communist Soviet Union.

Brzezinski, Carter's personal adviser, said in an interview with the *International Herald Tribune* on 10th October 1977 that a nuclear war would destroy only — and I underline only — 10 per cent of the world's population, that there was no need to let oneself be influenced by the terrifying propaganda slogans and that he was not there to advise the American President to do away with the button of the nuclear holocaust.

The present Defence Secretary Brown was even more explicit when he stated on the occasion of the presentation of the 1979 budget: "In other words, our total demand for strategic warheads does not only depend on alert rates, survivability, penetration probabilities and the number and types of targets to be covered; it is also a function of the need for some residual post-war capability."(14)

And so the inversion is completed: from Kennedy's peace, based on free competition to Carter's peace, based on the forces of a residual post-war strategic war capacity, i.e. a peace of the graves for the dead and the security of slaves for the living.

The terrifying aspect of the involution of U.S. military policy is the attempt to convince U.S.

public opinion that it is possible to wage a strategic war, that it is possible to win it and that the price of 20 to 30 million U.S. dead, leaving aside the hundreds of millions of dead in other countries, is an equitable and acceptable price to pay for the destruction for ever of the Soviet Union and communism in the world.

The result of the new U.S. strategic doctrines was the inevitable intensification of the arms race. General Seignious, the director of ACDA — Arms Control and Disarmament Agency — the official body which deals with all arms negotiations, Salt II, the reduction of armed forces in Central Europe, nuclear questions, etc., said on 1st May 1979 in a State Department report: "During the period of the Salt I interim agreement we deployed an average of almost 3 new warheads a day on our strategic forces, a total of over 5,000 warheads in five years." (15) And production continues at an accelerated rhythm. At present, according to the same Mr. Seignious, of the 14,000 existing nuclear warheads owned by the two great powers, "two-thirds of those are ours." (16) — it is Mr. Seignious who is speaking — and one-third Soviet, which means that the United States possesses twice as many strategic nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union. And this calculation does not include airborne bombs where — with regard to bombers — superiority is two to one in favour of the United States.

When presenting the defence budget for 1980, Defence Secretary Brown stated: "Our strategic nuclear forces are already armed with more than 9,000 warheads, and that number will increase with the addition of Trident ballistic missiles and air-launched Cruise missiles." (17)

Mr. President,

These are official U.S. data which leave precious little space for NATO propaganda and which show who and what is conducting, promoting and stimulating the arms race.

The reasons why the United States wish to maintain an enormous strategic superiority over the Soviet Union are clearly indicated in the "Military Posture for 1979", submitted by General Brown — who was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — in January 1978. Brown writes: "This means that the territorial integrity must be assured and that an international environment must be maintained in which U.S. interests and U.S. freedom of action is ensured." (18)

I do not wish to offend the delicate ears of the friends of the United States by qualifying this military policy as imperialist.

The American doctrine is in fact not concerned with the defence of Europe, which has always been considered only in the context of the defence of U.S. interests. According to an interesting American expression, Europe is an **expendable item**, i.e. something which is consumed with usage, as the munitions of guns; the gun — the United States — remains intact while the munitions — European cannon fodder — will be destroyed in case of war. U.S. interests are concerned with a Europe that will not fall under Soviet control, with all its productive capacity intact. In the case of conflict, the destruction of Europe is by a long chalk preferable for the United States, especially if the destruction were to serve to attain important objectives for the United States, such as the destruction of the Soviet Union.

I should like to underline here that this is in no way cynical. The scorched earth strategy seems to be a cruel requirement of modern war and has been implemented by many nations. All the more reason why this strategy should become interesting when it is the scorched earth of other countries, even allied ones. I shall clarify this point even more, because it seems to me a very important one.

In the first period following the end of the war, right through the 'fifties, the only delivery systems for nuclear weapons were aircraft. With a series of alliances with 42 states the United States had procured for itself a chain of air bases encircling the Soviet Union, from which it could launch an effective nuclear offensive against the entire Soviet territory. The Soviet Union did not dispose of a corresponding chain of air bases, but it was in a position to cover the whole of Europe, starting from its own bases and/or those of the Warsaw Pact allies.

The strategy at that time, called the strategy of massive destruction, meant that any Soviet aggression would have led to the massive use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union itself and consequently a massive Soviet retaliation against the whole of NATO Europe. The destruction of Europe, not its defence, was the price the United States would have made its allies pay in order to obtain the destruction of the Soviet Union. British and French statesmen have repeatedly opposed the attempt, the wish by the Americans to use nuclear weapons, exactly because they wanted to avoid reprisals against Europe. When Truman during the Korean war, at a press conference on 30 November, 1950, threatened the use of the atomic weapon, the British Parliament revolted. President Truman himself wrote about this in his memoirs: "In London, one hundred Labour M.P.s signed a letter to Prime

Minister Attlee to protest the possibility of the use of the atomic bomb... No one who read the account of this debate could possibly escape the fact that the British were seriously worried."(19) As is well known, Attlee undertook a lightning trip to Washington, and the bomb was not dropped. Eisenhower, too, experienced British opposition to use of nuclear weapons. In 1959, during the Berlin crisis, the plans for defending the city provided the rather prompt use of atomic bombs. The British Prime Minister MacMillan was against this. Eisenhower writes in his memoirs: "I was very disturbed to hear a highly respected British friend of mine quoted as saying: 'The British will not be atomised over the stamping of papers.' "(20) (with the passing of sovereignty over East Berlin to the German Democratic Republic control over transit traffic from and to Berlin would have fallen into the competence of the GDR). Moreover, in the same memoirs Eisenhower underlines MacMillan's "anxiety about a nuclear attack on England"(21). French reaction to the U.S. administration's request to deploy nuclear weapons on French territory was even harsher. Eisenhower writes: "The first big difficulty that Secretary Herter encountered was not with the Russians but with the French. He had an unpleasant talk with Premier Michel Debré who informed him that President de Gaulle was withholding permission for the basing of nuclear warheads on French territory pending our favourable actions on three items: 1) full public acceptance of a 'Big Three' organisation he had proposed; 2) our acceptance of a proposal supporting the position of the French government regarding Algeria and 3) the accomplishment of nuclear equality among French, British, Americans and Soviets. These proposals were a little more than unrealistic and they implied that France was far more concerned with obtaining endorsement of her own ambitions than in acting as a partner in seeking an East-West settlement."(22)

THE STRATEGY OF THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE DESTRUCTION OF EUROPE

With the coming of intercontinental missiles the strategy of massive retaliation would not have been of any value because the Soviet Union was now in a position to retaliate with the same destruction of the United States. The United States changed its strategy, adopting one which is called the strategy of flexible response. It consists of the use of such forces necessary to stop a possible Soviet attack, without provoking the use of strategic nuclear weapons which would cause extremely serious destruction in the United States. In other words, the nuclear war must be limited to Europe only, for the defence of the United States. In the context of the present strategy of the flexible response, too, Europe continues to be an "expendable item". Since one of the reasons invoked by the Government was that of the importance of theatre weapons with the flexible strategy, I consider it opportune to provide the official documentation concerning their use. General Brown, at that time Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — as I have already said — stated in the Military Posture for fiscal year 1979 already quoted that "in the event aggression cannot be contained conventionally, theatre nuclear forces provide capabilities to fight the battle and an opportunity to terminate conflict short of strategic nuclear war"(23).

Mr. President,

I listened this morning with great interest to your concern to avoid an early use of strategic forces which would lead to the destruction of the United States and the Soviet Union. Would it be too much to ask for a similar solicitude to avoid the destruction of Europe? For the strategy of flexible response implies the destruction of Europe, in order to avoid that the Soviet Union and the United States. This would be a strategy of the defence of Europe! A high German official said to two U.S. Senators visiting Europe: "During the last 18 months NATO manoeuvres have five times defended my country which was destroyed five times." Furthermore, the theatre weapons deployed in Europe would be used solely on the basis of a U.S. decision. The former Chief of the General Staff of the Army has explicitly confirmed the position of complete subordination of our country to U.S. decisions in a document sent to the Senate on 23 February 1977, in which it is clearly said that there is no right of veto. Moreover, it is also said in this document — and this is very interesting — that "further guarantees are provided for the material possibility of intervention by the Italian side in order to prevent the use of these weapons where this was not authorised by the national authority, even if this possibility takes on different forms according to the bases and the warheads in question". In other words, in the case of a war against the Soviet Union, we would have to wage a war against the U.S. bases to occupy them and prevent the use of nuclear weapons. This is a theory which I leave to you to judge!

On 27 January 1978 the Defence Ministry sent me a new study of the Army General Staff, in which these points were confirmed.

In order to terminate with the nuclear theatre weapons, I should like to recall that Defence Secretary Brown, when presenting the defence budget for 1980, said that "U.S. theatre nuclear warheads deployed in Europe in support of NATO number about 7,000 – distributed among bombs, short and medium-range ballistic missiles, artillery projectiles, surface-to-air missiles, atomic, demolitory munitions and depth bombs. In addition, Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missile re-entry vehicles are committed to Saceur (who is the Allied Commander in Europe) for targeting."(24)

Against these seven thousand NATO theatre nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, the Soviet Union possesses about half that number of similar weapons deployed on its territory.

NATO'S SUPERIORITY IN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES

To sum up: the United States has twice as many strategic nuclear warheads and twice as many theatre nuclear weapons in Europe as the Soviet Union.

This is the general picture of the nuclear forces of the two powers, a picture which, however, does not take into account the British and French nuclear forces which threaten the Soviet Union from Europe nor the Chinese nuclear forces which threaten the Soviet Union from Asia.

But before dealing more directly with the problem of the SS 20, the Pershing II and the Cruise missiles, it is necessary to examine more completely the so-called Soviet military supremacy. At a press conference held on 25 April 1979, after the NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meeting, Defence Secretary Brown declared: "We have reached a point at which the United States and the Soviet Union have rough parity in strategic capability, and in conventional capability we and our allies are again probably in rough parity with the Soviet Union and its allies."(25) Expressed in the terms of specific figures, **Military Balance 1979–1980** of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies which enjoys extremely high prestige and greatest credibility in NATO, informs that the total of the Warsaw Pact forces amounts to 4.763.000 soldiers against 4.881.000 soldiers of NATO, which means

that the Warsaw Pact has altogether 118,000 soldiers less. But neither Brown nor **Military Balance** take into account the fact that three-quarters of the Soviet territory is in Asia, where the People's Republic of China predicts the inevitability of war. Thus the Soviet Union must defend itself on two fronts many thousands of miles distant from each other.

As the Chinese armed forces amount to 4,360,000 soldiers, the total of the Warsaw Pact forces is only 51.5 per cent of that of NATO and China.

Military Balance also lists (27) the military budgets for 1978. This reveals that the Warsaw Pact countries spend 160,406 million dollars, i.e. 89 per cent of the NATO budgets which amounted to 179,882 million. Taking into account also the Chinese budget, this figure sinks to 73 per cent. But the dollar budget evaluations of the Warsaw Pact are carried out by counting what the military forces of the Warsaw Pact would cost in the United States. This system leads to an exaggerated increase of the Warsaw Pact budgets for various reasons, the main one being that the cost of Soviet conscripted soldiers is worked out on the basis of the cost of U.S. volunteers. An interesting indication of the unjustified increase of the estimate of Soviet budgets is contained in an official CIA document which states that "if all the personnel costs are removed from both sides, U.S. outlays exceed the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defence activities by about 10 per cent over the period 1966-1977 as a whole." (28)

Another official indication of how the U.S. defence budget increased after the change from compulsory to voluntary military service was furnished by the then Defence Secretary Richardson,

whom I have already quoted earlier. He said in the Senate on 29 March 1973: "There has been a dramatic increase in manpower costs in recent years. Despite the substantial reduction of almost 1,6 million military and civilian service personnel from the F.Y. 1968 to F.Y. 1974 ... the total manpower costs will be more than 11 billion dollars higher. This is so primarily because the nation has chosen a different and more equitable kind of armed forces than it had previously - an all-volunteer force rather than a draft-based force." (29)

An official U.S. estimate made by ACDA, which I have already quoted earlier, says that in the decade from 1967 to 1976, although the estimates of the Warsaw Pact budgets are clearly exaggerated, as already stated, the Warsaw Pact itself spent 946,5 billion dollars on its military budgets which amounts to 75.5 per cent of the 1255,8 billion spent by NATO (30).

Finally a truly neutral source, not subject to any U.S. or NATO conditioning: the **SIPRI Yearbook 1979**, of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute writes that in 1978 the Warsaw Pact spent 79,816 million dollars, counted at the value of the dollar of 1973, which was 67 per cent of the NATO expenses for the same year, also pegged to the 1973 value, which amounted to 119,412 million dollars. If the 29,000 million dollars of the Chinese budget for the same year are added to that, the Pact spent only 61.2 per cent of the amount spent by its enemies in Europe and Asia (31).

In order to finish with the military budgets, allow me to recall that Defence Secretary Brown underlines their importance in the already quoted report for the fiscal year 1980. He says: "Relative defense spending, annual or cumulative, is the best

single crude measure of relative military capabilities if efficiencies are not too different. And in military matters Soviet and U.S. efficiencies are not as far apart as in the civilian sector"(32).

Mr. President,

I should be grateful to you, if you could explain to me on the basis of what mental deformations it is possible to invert the terms of the estimate of official data from unexceptionable U.S. sources, showing that the Warsaw Pact has fewer soldiers and spends less for the armed forces than its enemies in Europe and Asia, in order to construe a Soviet military threat?

I understood this morning — I hope I misunderstood you — that you, Mr. President, refuse to take into consideration the Chinese threat; I do hope I misunderstood you, because if not, I think that you are much more extremist than the U.S. extremists. You have a deep understanding of military problems: I remember that you informed me in detail about U.S. military strategy at various meetings in which we both participated. So you must certainly know that until 1969 U.S. military strategy was a strategy of so-called two-and-a half wars, i.e. that the Americans thought that they needed sufficient forces to wage **simultaneously** two major wars, one in Asia and one in Europe, and a minor one, probably in Cuba or elsewhere. Chinese hostility regarding the Soviet Union after 1969 was judged world-wide to be so permanent, a factor that the Americans changed their strategy and adopted one which is called the strategy of one-and-a-half wars, that means they think that they need enough armed forces to be able to fight simultaneously one war in Europe and another one elsewhere: the effect of Chinese hostility has been considered fully valid from the U.S. politico-military point of view.

General David Jones, at present Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, states in a document of January 1979 that "the presence of nearly a billion neighbouring Chinese, the reality of a sizable Chinese military force on the Soviet border and China's actual, if limited strategic nuclear capacity also are undoubtedly sources of deep concern for the Soviets"(33).

One last reference to the MBFR, the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Central Europe. After six years of inconclusive negotiations, the process could lead to a positive solution, inasmuch as the Soviet Union has given a demonstration that the Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe amount to 805,000 and not 962,000 men, as estimated by NATO. NATO also affirms that its forces in the same area amount to only 782,000 soldiers. It must not be overlooked that if one were to take into consideration also the French armed forces which are in the centre of Europe, NATO forces would go up to 1,062,000 men. However, even when excluding these forces, the Pact superiority is limited to about twenty thousand soldiers, and it is in this context that Brezhnev's decision to withdraw unilaterally 20,000 soldiers constitutes a realistic move and one which corresponds to the spirit of detente, leading to that absolute parity which has always been clamoured for by NATO in order to really initiate the process of arms reduction. The propagandistic contortions of **Military Balance** in the course of this argumentation are significant. Until and including 1978 all the editions of **Military Balance** always underlined very strongly the supposed superiority of the Warsaw Pact. In the 1978 issue we can read that NATO has 626,000 combat forces in North and Central Europe against 942,000 of the Pact, of whom 638,000 are Soviet(34). The 1979-1980 issue, not being able to

contest the Soviet data, writes: "Manpower comparisons are not felt to be particularly valuable, and we no longer attempt such a comparison"(35). It seems to me that this requires no comment. What NATO seeks is not balance but unquestionable superiority, even at the price of sudden propagandistic contortions.

That would leave the tanks, of course: a proof of the inconsistency of the NATO theses regarding the superiority of the Pact, which is impossible, would be too lengthy to be given to this audience: I shall merely recall that Defence Secretary Brown, whom I have already quoted, stated "I am of course aware that we estimate the Soviets as having more than 45,000 tanks while the United States has only 10,000 but while we recognise the Soviet armor threat, that raw comparison does not convince me of the military Soviet superiority in Central Europe or make it advisable for the United States to bring another 35,000 tanks. Our allies happen to have tanks as well as anti-tanks launchers — of which we and our allies have already acquired more than 17,000 — and more than 40,000 anti-tank missiles are also relevant to stopping tanks. It is most unlikely, in any event, that the Soviets could bring these tanks to bear against the United States and its allies"(36).

One last consideration regarding the unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 USSR soldiers, 1,000 tanks and other war material. About one month ago, the United States launched a frenetic propaganda campaign round 2,600 Soviet soldiers and 40 tanks which have been stationed in Cuba for many years and which, according to an explicit U.S. declaration, do not include the means for naval nor air landings, nor for "invading" the United States, however grotesque this hypothesis may seem, nor for landing

in any other American country. The perverse result of this absurd campaign was a motion in the Senate, requesting the U.S. government to increase the defence budget by 5 per cent annually in real terms instead of the 3 per cent already agreed upon. If one were to apply the same yardstick to the Soviet reductions, NATO would have to make considerable reductions to its own military budgets.

THE POLITICO-MILITARY DANGER OF THE PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES

Taking up more directly the problem of SS 20, the Pershing II and Cruise missiles, the history which you traced, Mr. President, of the NATO study of the danger which the SS20 and the Backfire allegedly represent is so full of ambiguities and confusion that it conveys impressions which are in direct opposition to reality; that is why I think that it is necessary to recount this history on the basis of official texts of various NATO organs.

On 8 December 1976 the final communique of the Atlantic Council made no reference whatever to Soviet theatre weapons; the final communique of the Defence Planning Committee of the same date refers in a general way to an "expected" deployment of the SS 20 mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of striking all of Europe and beyond. The final communique of the Nuclear Planning Group of 18 November 1976 states that "Ministers continued their discussion of improvements in the effectiveness of NATO's modernisation of the structures of theatre nuclear force posture... They agreed to continue their discussion of the political and military implications of new technology at future meetings"(37).

In 1976 NATO knew about the Soviet deployment of the SS 20, but this did not

necessitate any particular measure to be taken by the Alliance beyond studies of a very general character.

In the communique of the Atlantic Council of 11 May 1977, no reference is made to the SS 20; the NATO Ministerial Guidance of 18 May 1977, while making a general reference to the SS 20, then continues in point 2: "It is in the conventional field, however, where the growth of Warsaw Pact capability has been most pronounced. In particular the Warsaw Pact ground forces have the capability to stage a major offensive in Europe without reinforcement." In the 5th point of the same directive it is stated that "to avoid the need to use nuclear weapons at an early stage of a conflict a balanced force improvement should be carried out, with emphasis placed on conventional forces improvement".(38) The communique of the Atlantic Council of 9 December 1977 does not refer to the SS 20 and the communique of the Defence Planning Committee of 7 December 1977 not only does not refer to the SS 20 but states in point 3: "They (the Ministers, N.P.) expressed their concern at the continuous momentum of the military programmes of the Warsaw Pact which provide them with increasingly capable ground, naval and air force"(39). Finally the communique of the Nuclear Planning Group of 12 October states: "The Ministers have examined the proposals for future work in the field of planning of theatre nuclear forces, in preparation for the next meeting and as a part of the long-term defence programme"(40). Emphasis was in fact placed on the neutron weapon or enhanced radiation weapon.

So in 1977 NATO was not concerned with the SS 20 in the course of operative deployment but with conventional forces and with nuclear neutron weapons. I think the reasons for that non-concern

can be found in the statement by Defence Secretary Rumsfeld, who when presenting the already cited defence budget for 1978 said: "Theatre-wide strike forces include U.S. and allied nuclear armed tactic aircraft (for the U.S. primarily Air Force F 111, F 4, Navy A6 and A7) U.S. and FRG Pershing, UK Polaris, SLBM and bombers and some U.S. Poseidon SLBM warheads. These forces can execute pre-planned and selective strikes against a variety of targets in the theatre in support of both limited and theatre-wide operations"(41). Obviously the deployment of SS 20 did not give rise to any concern.

The final communique of the Atlantic Council of 31 May 1978 does not refer to the SS 20. The Long Term Defence Programme enumerates in the last place the modernisation of nuclear weapons in the following way: "Measures are being developed to ensure that NATO's theatre nuclear forces continue to play their essential role in NATO deterrence and defence posture"(42). No particular concern about the SS 20 which are not even mentioned.

The final communique of the Nuclear Planning Group of 19 October 1978 does not refer to the SS 20 while it states: "They (the Ministers) continued their consideration of necessary short and long term improvements to the theatre nuclear force posture in Europe and directed that studies and planning on this area should continue"(43). Thus, one year ago the committee expressly charged with nuclear theatre planning judged the situation to be calm enough to agree on a serene study phase. The final communique of the Atlantic Council of 8 December 1978 makes no explicit reference to the SS 20 and merely limits itself to stating in point 7 that "the Ministers noted with concern the continuing build-up of Warsaw Pact forces and armaments both conventional and nuclear"(44), a general concern not

motivated in any special way by the SS 20. In point 4, the final communique of the Defence Planning Committee of 6 December 1978 clearly underlines concern regarding the increasing military capability of the Warsaw Pact which allegedly enables it to conduct offensive operation with brief preparations at at time and place previously chosen. After stating concern regarding Soviet SS 20 and Backfire, point 5 concludes as follows: "These developments require close attention within the Alliance with due regard to all factors of importance in this context"(45). This is the first time that concern is expressed regarding the SS 20 and Backfire. However the reasons for the formulations in the communique which might appear ambiguous are clarified by what General Brown has to say in his remarks already cited concerning the forces in 1979.

Brown writes: "An even more serious question centers on Soviet deployment of the MIRV SS 20 mobile IRBM and the relationship between that system (which is outside SALT parameters so long as its range is less than 5 500 km) to the SS 16, which is included in SALT. The SS 20 comprises the first two stages of the three-stage SS 16. By upgrading SS 20 deployment into the SS 16, the Soviets could increase their mobile ICBM capability relatively quickly. This could be accomplished by the addition of a third SS 16 stage and payload to the two SS 20 stages. Such action could significantly increase the number of ICBMs in Soviet intercontinental forces. Upgrading of substantial numbers of SS 20 IRBMs to SS 16 ICBMs and their planned use as long-range missiles could degrade capabilities against regions near the Soviet border."(46).

Thus the highest U.S. authority does not fear the SS 20 but rather the possibility that the SS 20 might be transformed into intercontinental missiles

SS 16. The SS 20 do not represent any particular danger for Europe. Furthermore, it will be noted that even the danger of a transformation of SS 20 into SS 16 is far more theoretical than practical. The SS 16 was only once on trial as an intercontinental missile, and owing to difficulties which arose in connection with its thrust, it was transformed into an intermediate range missile. An opposite re-transformation would certainly require an experimental phase before its operative construction, which could certainly not escape U.S. observation.

The Nuclear Planning Group communique of 25 May 1979 is particularly important. It states that the Ministers took note of the SS 20 and that in their examination of a modernisation of the theatre forces within the framework of the long-term defence programme they confirmed that for a credible dissuasion in Europe, NATO could not rely on conventional forces alone, but that it was necessary to maintain and update the nuclear theatre forces **"without increasing dependence on the nuclear weapons or prejudicing long-term defence improvements in conventional forces"**. **"No decision was taken at this stage"** regarding the possible updating of long-range theatre components. "The Ministers emphasized that consideration of a modernisation effort would need to take full account of **arms control possibilities**" (47).

Three points emerge clearly from this communique: the need for further studies, i.e. the non-dramatic character of the SS 20; the concern about not increasing the role of nuclear forces, leaving theatre tasks to theatre forces and strategic tasks to strategic forces; and finally the concern about control. The deployment of Cruise missiles in Europe would make control impossible. In this context, a document of April 1977 assumes

particular importance, in which the U.S. National Security Council states that "Tomahawk (i.e. the Cruise missile that is intended for deployment in Europe, as are for that matter all the other Cruise missiles) raises complex issues due to its relatively small size, mission flexibility and its compatibility with different kinds of launch platforms... Verification of arms control limitation with Tomahawk is a difficult problem. Cruise missile range, for example, is difficult to verify because range can be extended through non-detectable changes in flight profile or payload fuel rations"(48).

Thus the deployment of Cruise missiles in Europe would render any future negotiations for limitations of theatre weapons impossible, since their control is impossible, and would dangerously increase mutual mistrust.

In the same document the same National Security Council states that: "Short-range regional systems such as Pershing are outside the SALT II negotiations. The improvements included in Pershing II should not impact on these negotiations (SALT 2) since its range would remain at 400 nautical miles and the system would continue to be classified as non-strategic"(49).

Today the Pershing, which by the way has retained nothing but the name of the previous programme in order to confuse public opinion, has a decidedly strategic range and would deprive SALT 2 of any meaning, precluding future SALT 3 negotiations.

In an interview granted to *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* on April 1979, Brzezinski, who certainly cannot be considered a dove, stated that there were discussions in progress at a high level inside NATO

and that "the purpose of these talks is to establish what might be the best means for ensuring European security, perhaps through the promotion of arms control within the European context and through the introduction, if necessary, of new weapons systems designed to respond to the Soviet Union deployment of the SS 20 which clearly is threatening to Western Europe"(50).

To a question which was raised Brzezinski replied: "We do recognise, however, the European theatre nuclear force problem has now matured to a point which is the proper object not only for inter-allied discussion but, before too long, for East-West arms control discussion as well"(51). Thus, a few months ago, Brzezinski himself placed greater emphasis on the need for East-West negotiations on theatre weapons than on the deployment of new weapons in Europe which would render these negotiations impossible or at least very difficult.

In the communique of the Nuclear Planning Group of 25 April 1979 it is stated that "no decision was taken at this stage. Ministers emphasised that consideration of a modernisation effort would need to take full account of arms control possibilities, and they noted with approval that these are being studied in further depth by a Special Group recently set up in NATO for this purpose"(52).

Lastly, the final communique of the Atlantic Council meeting of 31 May 1979 states in the final paragraph that "the necessity to maintain and modernise theatre nuclear forces in support of the strategy of forward defence and flexible response, envisaging no increase in overall reliance on nuclear systems, has recently been reaffirmed. At the same

time, in line with the fundamental dual objectives of detente and deterrence, they emphasise the need for a response to this challenge, which combines the complementary approaches of force improvements and arms control. In preparation for the decisions to be made, the Ministers welcomed the fact that the Special Group was working parallel with the High Level Group"(53). The final communique of the Defence Planning Committee of 16 May, although underlining the danger represented by the SS 20, states in point 11 that "NATO must continue to emphasise the strengthening of its conventional forces, while maintaining credible capability within and linkage between the strategic nuclear and theatre nuclear force elements of the NATO triad and avoiding any lowering of the nuclear threshold... They emphasised the need for the parallel consideration of theatre nuclear force modernisation and arms control and stressed that no increase in overall reliance on nuclear systems or departure from existing NATO policy is envisaged"(54).

In other words, the arguments already developed in previous periods were repeated: examination of the modernisation of theatre weapons without letting them become more strategic, i.e. without changing NATO policy.

Would you, Sir, explain to us what happened in three months and why all NATO decisions were reversed?

The negotiations offered by Brzhnev in Berlin on 6 October last, which represented the most pressing need of the alliances were rejected without any motivation. Examination of the modernisation of theatre weapons has turned into the imposition of the deployment of strategic weapons which render present and future agreements useless. Why?

In your statement you have repeatedly underlined a lack of balance and a danger which was allegedly brought about by the SS 20, yet all the NATO documentation shows that this is a thesis without foundation.

Besides, it is enough to use common sense. The SS 20 are nothing but a modernisation of the SS 4 and SS 5 which are some twenty years old. The only exceptional factor is that this modernisation should have taken place with such a delay. The Americans, for example, have updated the weapons of their submarines six times within a shorter lapse of time, with Polaris 1, Polaris 2 and Polaris 3 which retain the same name but are different weapons, with Poseidon, Trident 1 and Trident 2.

The features which distinguish the SS 20 from the older missiles are: three nuclear warheads instead of one, greater precision, greater range and mobility. The three nuclear warheads instead of one naturally require that the substitution be affected at the rate of one SS 20 for three older missiles, a fact which can be easily controlled by U.S. reconnaissance satellites. The greater precision compensates more or less satisfactorily for the smaller explosive power of the nuclear warheads of the SS 20, which amounts to about one-seventh to one-eighth of that of the older missiles. Thus there is no practical increase of destructive capacity. The greater range does not concern Europe, since the range of the old missiles covered the whole of Europe already. It is on the other hand important for the USSR to face an increasing Chinese threat and to balance, certainly very incompletely, in Africa and the Middle East, the U.S. non-strategic nuclear capacity based on aircraft carriers.

With regard to the mobility, this is a positive

and balancing factor, since it deprives the enemy of the possibility of carrying out a surprise attack in order to disarm the adversary. To consider it a negative factor would mean to say explicitly that NATO is preparing aggressive actions against Soviet Union, which in effect might even correspond to the truth.

Mr. President, Members of the Senate,

These are not just my conjectures but those of the official U.S. authorities who are in this way justifying the construction of the intercontinental mobile MX missiles which will cost 30 or one hundred billion dollars, according to various estimates. But then it is necessary that we arrive at a common understanding, for it seems to me that one cannot maintain that the same features of one weapons system are defensive when it is being installed by the United States and offensive when it is being installed by the Soviet Union.

I gave a demonstration of simple common sense. And since it is quite possible that common sense is not a characteristic element of the Government and the political Parties of the nuclear holocaust, I also cited an ample documentation from official Western sources which confirms the common sense thesis. I shall cite another source of unequivocal adherence to U.S. theses, **Military Balance 1979-1980**. After a thorough, accurate and profound examination of all the components of NATO and Warsaw Pact long-range theatre weapons, the publication says that "We therefore conclude that something very close to parity now exists between the theatre nuclear forces of NATO and Warsaw Pact, although it is moving in favour of the Warsaw Pact"(54). And the same publication adds: "If the Soviet Union were to retire the SS 4 and SS 5 missiles, our calculations show that another 140 SS 20 would do

the job of the 590 SS4 and SS5 missiles"(55). Since according to the same source the Soviet Union produces about 50 SS 20 annually, it will take more than 3 years before the Soviet Union will be able to attain a modest advantage regarding this particular family of weapons, while the enormous disadvantage concerning strategic nuclear warheads and theatre weapons vis-a-vis the United States, of which I have previously spoken, remains.

One last consideration.

The President, Senator Pasti, you have largely exceeded your time limit. I did not interrupt you because the facts were interesting and, it seemed to me, should be heard by all.

Pasti: I am aware of the fact that your request is perfectly warranted. But I have presented three interrogations: at fifteen minutes each, maybe I still have time to draw a conclusion.

President: Really, even taking into account the three interrogations of fifteen minutes each, you have largely exceeded the time limit, using up the economy which Senator Pozzo conceded to you, who had saved 10 minutes on his intervention.

Cossiga, President of the Council of Ministers, and the ad interim Foreign Minister: I do not know whether I have time to concede, but maybe you can take five minutes of my time.

President: It is not my intention to cut you off. I just want to beg you to condense your text.

Pasti: I have six minutes left. One last consideration: You maintain that the SS 20 of the Soviet Union are capable of hitting with precision

NATO theatre missile systems in Europe, whereas the latter are not capable of striking at the SS 20 launching sites because of their greater mobility, and you consider that the hypothesis advanced by the Soviet Union of a global balance between the United States and the Soviet Union would be serious because it would not provide sufficiently for the development of Western Europe "as a separate political entity" and that, therefore, it is necessary to re-establish the balance between Europe and the Soviet Union. This thesis is very similar to the one advanced by Kissinger.

Mr. President, Members of the Senate,

I would like to request you to re-read the sacred texts of the Alliance. It is not the Soviet Union that demands parity on a world scale but the United States which stipulated, as the basis of the Atlantic Alliance, its global nuclear strategic superiority and which today does not wish to lose it and therefore demands the deployment of strategic missiles in Europe. It is true that Europe has accepted not to be a political entity by adhering to NATO, but neither would it become one with the Pershing 2 and the Cruise because these weapons would always remain weapons to be used by exclusively U.S. decision. Europe would gain nothing in autonomy but would, on the other hand, become a priority Soviet target if it accepts this deployment.

It would be the repetition of an experience long since dead. You, Sir, certainly know that this experience was attempted with the Multilateral Force — MLF — abandoned in October 1964. As is well known, at the end of 1961, in order to diminish the importance of the autonomous French nuclear forces, firmly opposed by the United States, and in order to "win over" Federal Germany to nuclear armament, rendering the different positions taken by

Germany and France in the nuclear fields less sharp, the State Department proposed to place strategic missiles on ships which were to be the common property of the nations participating in the project, with mixed crews. The project went through many stages. The idea of placing the missiles on submarines was abandoned in favour of a project of surface vessels, and navigation exercises with mixed crews were carried out. The entire programme ground to a halt, on the one hand for political reasons — no one either in the East nor even in the West would have been very happy to see greater weight given to Federal Germany in nuclear decisions — and on the other hand for the practical reasons of who would press the nuclear button. The decision to use these weapons required the positive vote of the U.S. authorities, for whom, if the decision were negative, the MLF would have been useless, whereas a positive decision would simply mean an increase of U.S. strategic forces. Finally the political reasons as well as the practical reasons of the right to use the weapons led to the project being filed. It seems very serious to me that today, if the political reasons have been overcome — and they have lost nothing of their validity — there remain the practical reasons of the use of these weapons, which show clearly how the Kissinger thesis and all the other theses of a balance between Europe and the Soviet Union and of a Europe as a "political entity" do not have and cannot have a sound basis.

But the thesis of a balance of zones is dangerous because it leads to a tremendous increase of the arms race. The United States can hit targets in member countries of the Warsaw Pact, allies of the Soviet Union, whereas they cannot strike at the United States. Thus it is necessary for these nations to have their own strategic weapons. But then Krushchev was right when he wanted to deploy nuclear weapons in

Cuba!

I am coming to the end, Mr. President, perhaps I am alone with my statement, yet I think that I have an ally of great importance: your conscience. Political ambition is certainly a positive stimulus, provided it does not smother nor prevail over a person's conscience. I do not say this to you in any polemical spirit but on the contrary, you have given a rare example in the world of Italian politics that moral conscience is above political aspirations. I beg you instantly: listen to the voice of your conscience as an honest citizen, as a true and genuine believer: I am sure that you will thus find it impossible to become responsible for a nuclear holocaust.

Therefore: No to Pershing and Cruise. Therefore: Yes to negotiations. Thank You.

APPENDIX TO THE STATEMENT

The overwhelming majority of the Senators who spoke in the debate underlined three subjects which merit further clarification.

1. Alleged military superiority of the Warsaw Pacts

Secretary of State Vance said at a press conference on 26 October last in Florida that "together we and our allies invest about 25 per cent more in defence than the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact." The Eurogroup, which consists of the European NATO nations, announced just before Christmas that in 1979 the European NATO budgets had reached 50 billion dollars in total and that this figure would rise to a good 70 billion in 1980 and that a still greater increase was expected for 1981. Brown said in a television conference on 22 May 1977 that "the Soviets had been increasing of their soldiers along the frontiers with the NATO countries from 1968 but that for several consecutive years now their armed forces have remained at the same level." An official Pentagon speaker affirmed on 23 December 1977 that "the Soviet Union had maintained its military spending at a constant level in terms of real value of the dollar for about fifteen years". At that moment American public opinion still remembered President Carter's election promise to reduce the defence budget. Thus Brezhnev was right when he said that the Soviet armed forces had not been increased for a number of years. Finally,

Defence Secretary Brown, when presenting the astronomical increases in the U.S. defence budget on 13 December of last year (1978) said that these increases were necessary so that the United States remains "the strongest national power in the world."

These are official data which do not require any comment and which show the falseness of U.S. propaganda, only too readily accepted by the Government and the Parties of the nuclear holocaust.

2. Indictment of the Soviet Union for not having proposed negotiations before building the SS 20

This accusation is absolutely false and turns the truth upside down. At the press conference in Vladivostok on 24 November 1974, after the agreement on the limitation of nuclear strategic weapons, Kissinger said: "As you know, the Soviet Union has maintained that the forward based systems (F.B.S. in military jargon, that is what we call the theatre nuclear weapons) should be included in the total (of the strategic weapons) and this was one of the big obstacles to an agreement previously. The progress that has been made in recent months is that the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking for compensation for the F.B.S., partly because most of the forward based systems, or I would say all of them, are not suitable for a significant attack on the Soviet Union." It was then the United States which rejected any discussion on theatre nuclear weapons. Moreover, it was Kissinger himself who confirmed that the Soviet Union had accepted this exclusion only because the theatre weapons were not capable of striking its territory. With the deployment of the Pershing 2 and Cruise this is not longer true. This is one more demonstration of the "fickleness" of Kissinger's opinions! Finally the theatre nuclear weapons will be included in SALT 3, and it is the

fault of the United States, which has not yet ratified SALT 2, if SALT 3 cannot be started.

3. Concern about an alleged continued increase of Soviet superiority

I should like to state even more specifically that SALT regulates the balance of the means of delivery and not of the strategic nuclear warheads, which, according to official U.S. documentation are at a ratio of 2 to 1 in favour of the United States. With the introduction of the U.S. Trident submarines – the first one became operative in October 1979 – which carry 24 missiles instead of the 16 of the previous Poseidon submarines, and with the introduction of the Cruise missiles, the U.S. strategic warheads will increase more rapidly than the Soviet ones are able to. Rumsfeld, whom I have already quoted, when presenting the budget for 1978, projected graphically up to 1985, date of expiration of SALT 2, the strategic nuclear warheads of the two powers. Those of the U.S. will exceed the Soviet warheads by about 5000 units during that entire period. Even if we accept the worst hypothesis, namely that the Soviet Union builds the fifty SS 20 annually, i.e. 150 nuclear warheads, without withdrawing the old SS 4 and SS 5, it would need about 33 years before it could balance the 5000 U.S. strategic nuclear warheads – which could be targeted to destroy many other objectives and not only the SS 20 – without reducing the strategic equivalence in nuclear warheads between the U.S. and the USSR.

However, Carter and Brown have repeatedly stated that the SS 20 substitute the old SS 4 and SS 5, while on 5 December last an official representative of the Pentagon specified that out of the 100 SS 20 deployed by the Soviets only 60 are aimed at European targets.

As regards the Backfire aeroplanes, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy are building a plane – the MRCA Tornado – a nuclear carrier, very sophisticated and very costly, capable of flying at low altitude to avoid enemy interception, capable of penetrating deeply into Soviet territory. It will need about 27 years before the 30 Backfire planes which the Soviet Union is authorised to build each year can balance the 809 Tornado.

Obviously, the reasons why the United States is imposing Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles on Europe have nothing to do with those put forward by its propaganda and accepted supinely by the Government and the Parties of the nuclear holocaust.

APPENDIX

On 16 April 1980 Senator Pasti spoke again on military problems in the Italian Senate. After once again pointing out that the Soviet armed forces are purely defensive, Senator Pasti continued as follows:

Finally, I should like to recall that the West German Chancellor Schmidt stated in an interview on 29 May 1978: "I do not believe that the balance of forces has changed in favour of the Soviets. I know that this is the estimate of the U.S. intelligence services, shared also by others, but I do not think that this is correct."

The nuclear forces deserve a special comment. SALT 2, even if and when ratified, concerns strategic delivery systems and not nuclear warheads. In the quoted document Defence Secretary Brown states that at present there exist 9200 U.S. strategic nuclear warheads (according to SIPRI estimates the figure is about 12 000) as compared to 6000 Soviet warheads. With the introduction of the U.S. mobile MX missile, of the Trident submarine and the Cruise missiles, the existing gap will widen still further. But what is even worse is the fact that only 20 per cent of the Soviet nuclear warheads can be delivered by submarine-borne missiles as against 50 per cent of the U.S. warheads. This means that a U.S. surprise attack, a so-called "first-strike" capable of destroying

Soviet ground missiles and planes, would leave only 20 per cent of the Soviet strategic nuclear warheads intact, i.e. about 1200 installed on submarines. On the other hand, 50 per cent of the U.S. strategic warheads, i.e. 4600 would escape a comparable Soviet surprise attack.

But even this count is not correct, inasmuch as the planned U.S. MX mobile missiles would escape a surprise attack because they are mobile, while in the fight against submarines the United States finds itself in a position of great advantage for reasons of geography and technology. All that signifies that the possibility of a "first-strike" capable of disarming the Soviet Union and thus drive it to accept unconditional surrender is constantly becoming more likely and more dangerous.

This is the framework inside which the grave Italian decision regarding the deployment of U.S. missiles on our continent has to be placed. They are strategic missiles which would increase U.S. "first-strike" possibilities and thus render U.S. nuclear preventive war less unlikely. General Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in an official document (dated January last): "The force (Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles) will be sufficiently large to pose a credible threat to the Soviet Union."

I am not going to repeat what I said already in my speech on 10 December last regarding the absurd concept of considering the American missiles, which are strategic weapons as balancing the Soviet SS 20 missiles, which are theatre weapons. Moreover it is not true that the substitution of the Soviet SS 4 and SS 5 missiles, which are about 20 years old and no longer provide any guarantee of reliable functioning, by the SS 20 poses a greater threat to Europe. As a matter of fact the contrary is true: the nuclear

explosive of the SS 20 warheads amounts to only one seventh of that of the old missiles. Furthermore, General Jones stated clearly that only one half of the SS 20 is deployed against Europe.

With regard to the danger allegedly posed by the Soviet **Backfire** plane, NATO propaganda has consistently forgotten to take into consideration the MRCA **Tornado** plane, 800 of which are at present being produced in Europe (100 of them in Italy). This is how General Jones described the role and characteristics of the **Tornado**: "The Panavia **Tornado**, to be employed in the nuclear strike role in Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, incorporates advanced systems that make the aircraft an extremely effective all-weather low-level penetrator. The **Tornado's** strike radius is significantly greater than that of the F 104 fighters which stand quick reaction alert at many NATO bases today."

The unexpected and unjustifiable decision to deploy U.S. strategic missiles in Europe was preceded by other grave decisions: the declared desire of the U.S. Senate not to ratify SALT 2; the Cuban minicrisis round the 2600 Soviet soldiers — who have been stationed on this island for over ten years — artificially created to alarm public opinion and sway the Senate to vote a motion demanding from the government an annual 5 per cent increase in real terms of the defence budget instead of the 3 per cent decided previously; the preparations for Defence Secretary Brown's visit to China to finalise the strategic-military agreements between the United States and China.

Finally, the decision to accept the Euro-missiles was followed by a declaration made by Brown on 14 December last in the Senate, on the need to increase

the defence budget for the coming five-year period by over 5 per cent annually in real terms because — this was the official justification given by Defence Secretary Brown — "the United States must remain the strongest nation in the world".

Lastly I should like to recall that the American Senator Birch Bayh, Chairman of the Select Senate Committee on Intelligence openly stated that the United States had provided arms for the Afghan rebels before the Soviet intervention.

On 27 December last the Soviet Union dispatched its troops to Afghanistan. This order of events requires a profound and dispassionate examination of the situation, not in order to justify the dispatch of Soviet soldiers to Afghanistan but to understand its specific character and remove its causes, because that is the only way to avoid the worst. To follow the United States in its bellicose frenzy of accelerated arms build-up, its "invasion" of the Indian Ocean, its search for new military bases, its alleged right to be once again the gendarme of the world and to impose its decisions on friends and non-friends would lead to a worsening of the situation and a sharpening of the crisis itself to danger-point.

Italy, which is situated in Europe and a member of NATO should act in the spirit of mediation and equilibrium. In order to accomplish this task, which is indispensable for detente, security and peace, Italy must revoke the nefarious decision to accept the Euro-missiles which constitute the primary cause of justified Soviet preoccupations.

In an action of this kind we would not find ourselves isolated. The **International Herald Tribune**, a paper which is certainly not pro-communist,

devoted a great deal of space on 31 March last to opinions expressed by Herbert Wehner, who holds an important position in the Social-Democratic Party of the FRG. Wehner, who is against the deployment of the Euro-missiles in West Germany maintains that the Soviet deployment in Europe is defensive, that the attack in Afghanistan is essentially a preventive measure and that the world should patiently await the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as it patiently awaited the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

Mr. President,

A heavy responsibility weighs on Italy and its Government. Either we shall be able to contribute actively to the halting of the present mad arms race or the middle 'eighties, when the U.S. will have deployed the new and still more dangerous mobile missiles, the new and still more dangerous Trident missiles, the new and still more dangerous Cruise missiles, the new and still more dangerous strategic missiles in Europe, the new task force supported by new bases and new logistic support vessels which will permit it to intervene immediately in any part of the world — either we shall contribute effectively to halting this frantic arms race or the middle 'eighties will be tragic for the destiny of mankind.

MILITARY BUDGETS 1968–1977

in billions of dollars at 1973 constant value
(from SIPRI Yearbook 1979 p. 35)

YEAR	NATO	CHINA	TOTAL	WARSAW PACT
1968	140.9	21.8	162.7	63.4
1969	136.3	23.8	160.1	67.8
1970	127.4	25.8	153.2	69.2
1971	122.5	27.1	149.6	70.5
1972	125.1	26.1	151.2	71.7
1973	121.7	26.2	147.9	73.—
1974	122.—	26.6	148.6	74.4
1975	120.8	27.4	148.2	75.8
1976	117.7	27.5	145.2	77.3
1977	121.2	28.3	149.5	78.5
	1255.6	260.6	1516.2	712.6

SIPRI, which is situated in Stockholm, is a research institute completely independent of both military blocks. It worked out the estimate of the defence budgets of the Warsaw Pact on the basis of an in-depth study of all the budgets of the Pact countries, in order to single out items which, although not inscribed in the defence budgets, concern the years in question and the armed forces.

In ten years the Warsaw Pact spent only 57 per cent of the defence budgets of NATO and 47 per cent of the defence budgets of the opposing forces of NATO plus China.

In 1978 the Warsaw Pact spent only 67 per cent of the military budgets of NATO. This percentage drops to 61 per cent if compared to the combined military expenditure of NATO and China.

MILITARY BUDGETS 1968-1977

in billions of dollars at the 1976 value
(from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1968-1977. Edited October 1979 by the official U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)

YEAR	NATO	CHINA	TOTAL	WARSAW PACT
1968	179.6	26.5	206.1	117.8
1969	174.1	27.5	201.6	121.9
1970	163.—	31.3	194.3	124.8
1971	155.5	32.2	187.7	128.2
1972	157.7	32.2	189.9	131.8
1973	154.—	33.2	187.2	138.6
1974	156.2	33.2	189.4	142.9
1975	153.3	34.1	187.4	146.5
1976	150.—	34.1	184.1	151.6
1977	156.1	33.2	189.3	154.5
	1599.5	317.5	1917.—	1358.6

Despite the fact that the estimates of the Warsaw Pact budgets are unjustifiably exaggerated -for example the cost of the military are estimated on the basis of the costs of U.S. volunteers and not on the basis of Soviet conscripts - during the ten years under review the Warsaw Pact spent 18 per cent less than NATO and 41 per cent less than the combined opposing forces of NATO in Europe and China in Asia.

At a press conference in Florida on 26 October 1979 Secretary of State Vance stated that "WE AND OUR ALLIES INVEST APPROXIMATELY 25% MORE IN DEFENSE THAN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WARSAW PACT".

ARMED FORCES 1979

in thousands
(from the Military Balance 1979-1980 p. 96)

NATO		WARSAW PACT	
Belgium	86.8	Bulgaria	150.—
Britain	322.9	Czechoslovakia	194.—
Canada	80.—	East Germany	159.—
Denmark	34.7	Hungary	104.—
France	509.3	Poland	317.5
Greece	184.6	Romania	180.5
Italy(1)	365.—	Soviet Union	3658.—
Netherlands	114.8		
Norway	39	total (Warsaw Pact)	4763.—
Portugal	60.5		
Turkey	566.—		
United States	2022.—		
West Germany	495.—		
total (NATO)	4880.6		
China	4360		
NATO + China	9240.6		

The Warsaw Pact has about 118,000 soldiers less than NATO, which in reality are 200,000 taking the Italian carabinieri into account.

The Warsaw Pact has only 52 per of the combined opposing forces of NATO in Europe and China in Asia.

- (1) In addition, Italy disposes of 84,500 carabinieri, who are regular forces of the Army and are not included in the above figures.

ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATE OF THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ALLIANCE, THE NATO REVIEW, OF 1 FEBRUARY 1980, THE NATO FORCES AMOUNT TO 5,256,000. THEREFORE THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AMOUNT TO 90 PER CENT OF THE NATO FORCES AND TO 50 PER CENT OF THE COMBINED OPPOSING FORCES OF NATO AND CHINA.

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
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Senator Nino Pasti, the author of this brochure, is a high-ranking Nato General (retired).

Here are some quotations from this publication:

"Owing to a strange mental orientation, the West maintains without any in-depth examination, that all information of Soviet origin is propaganda in the derogatory sense of the word, while all information from U.S. sources is nothing but gospel truth. The U.S. intelligence service can calmly — either directly or through the obliging information media of other countries — propagate those news items which are best suited to serve U.S. domestic and foreign policy. It is dangerously gullible to assume that this news is correct and reflects a true picture of the Warsaw Pact Forces ..." (p. 5)

"Today, as I shall show in my presentation, the U.S. has a considerable nuclear superiority with regard to strategic as well as theatre weapons; the deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles would be dangerous and provocative, just as the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba would have been ..." (p. 11-12)

"The terrifying aspect of the involution of U.S. military policy is the attempt to convince U.S. public opinion that it is possible to wage a strategic war, that it is possible to win it and that the price of 20 to 30 million U.S. dead, leaving aside the hundreds of millions of dead in other countries, is an equitable and acceptable price to pay for the destruction forever of the Soviet Union and communism in the world ..." (p. 15-16)

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