

# 4 The Normalization of Places and Spaces: Tourism and Transformation – A Glossary on the Eye-of-Authority

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## Prologue

This chapter is the second of two chapters that seek to situate Foucault's applied work on dominance and subjugation in everyday institutional discourse to tourism settings and to tourism studies research contexts. Chapter 3 by Hollinshead, Ivanova and Caton introduced Foucault's outlook on the mundane/quotidian habitual forms of practice which all fields/institutions/disciplines have, and it sought to explain how Foucault's views on the ordinary/banal *governmentality of things* could be applied to day-by-day subject making in tourism/tourism studies, just as in any other domain of discourse and praxis.

To recap, the previous chapter on the political economy of things explained that Foucauldian forms of power-knowledge within institutions work as a form of normalized truth 'there': that is, dominant/hegemonic truths serve as an ensemble of ordered procedures that (sometimes consciously but, more consequentially, unconsciously) act as a circular system – or conditioning formative force – which governs what is sayable or doable within the given institutional field of relations.

In this succeeding chapter, Hollinshead, Caton and Ivanova now seek to define rather more closely what Foucault actually meant by terms such as 'the apparatus', 'specular bias'

and 'truth statements', and a 12-term glossary is provided to that end (see Appendix). Principally, the authors seek to explain how, when someone working within an institutional realm like tourism or tourism studies seeks to transform things by removing a particular dominant outlook or thought or by correcting for a particular silence or suppression, just how he/she might need to develop his/her own *rapport à soi* (self-rapport) vis-à-vis the prevailing political economy of truth.

Thus, after Foucault, to what degree in tourism/tourism studies are you already caught up – unsuspectingly/undersuspectingly – working as an *agent of normalization* in concretizing received or assumed representations of the world, whether you work in the business of tourism or in tourism studies research – or otherwise whether you just exist as a traveller around and about the world? If you are going to help transform the destinations and drawcards of a place or space, where do you currently stand in terms of the existing regimes of truth that govern just what host populations show and just what tourists go to see under the hegemonic tourism and travel repertoires of our time?

In order to help gauge how the Foucauldian insights that are contained in the glossary can be of use to those who work in tourism/tourism studies, this follow-up chapter is

equipped with a number (ten) of short respondent comments on the governmentality of things. The purpose of these ten Reflexive Critiques (each of which is signified by a ▲) is to encourage individuals who are somewhat engaged in tourism/tourism studies research to strongly reflect upon their own influence/work/service in the governance of places and spaces. If he/she/you is/are to have a transformative effect upon the world of drawcards and destinations in tourism and travel, how can awareness of Foucauldian matters of normalization and/or naturalization help him/her/you transform himself/herself/yourself to that end? And, taken together, the ten Reflexive Critiques do not point to any desired effort to learn how to deal in more *precise* and *exact truths* about the projected people, places and presents of tourism, but they signal matters of 'style'. If an individual is to have effects upon the world, the later Foucault considers that matters of personal aesthetics (or personal ethics) rule. In order to have decent or worthwhile effect upon *others* (i.e. meaning in the context of this book upon other people, other places, other pasts and other presents) the incumbent individual must first learn how to cultivate himself/herself/yourself. As in the preceding companion chapter, this follow-up chapter principally addresses the late Foucauldian stylistic drive to cultivate a personal aesthetics of existence, be it in ordinary travel, in the management of tourism or in research into the so-called 'subjects' of tourism.

### **Continuing the Inspection into the Governmentalities of Tourism/ Tourism Studies: The Need for an Improved Conceptual Vocabulary on the Normalization of Places and Spaces**

Having accounted for some of the rudimentary understandings embedded in and of Foucauldian constructions of governmentality and subjectivity in Chapter 3, it is now appropriate to introduce the glossary (see also the Appendix), which has been developed to cover these everyday Foucauldian acts of normalization that inevitably occur in and through tourism (and in and through tourism studies).

The words defined or explained in this chapter are taken from a list of 55 Foucauldian terms being prepared for a pair of manuscripts (Hollinshead, in preparation/a and Hollinshead, in preparation/b). The reduced collection that now appears at the end of the book thus contains 12 concepts/constructions that speak in various ways to Foucauldian approaches to normalization and, thereby, to complicitous institutional action. In the list below, the terms shown constitute the aggregate glossary (at the time of writing) of the 55 items from the two articles being prepared by Hollinshead for publication elsewhere. The terms shown with an asterisk comprise the concepts/constructions explained now in this chapter. The following shortlist is, thus, loosely and briefly suggestive of where – in the Foucauldian constellation of metaphors – the terms conceivably fit. The list is only roughly indicative, of course, and myriad other classificatory shortlists could be drawn up that posit these Foucauldian insights in regard to entirely different typological schemas. It would not necessarily be helpful to try to produce a wholly deterministic and 'all-purpose' diagnostic list: Foucault would turn in his grave against such a resolute ordering of things, and such a concretization of singular interpretations! Foucault certainly admired – or sought to register – the natural plural knowability about things.

#### **▲ Reflexive critique 1: The celebration of plural knowability**

To Foucault, interpretation is an infinite thing, and the ethically sound individual is therefore one who is open to other influences and other interpretations outside of himself/herself. Such persons can become (ought to learn how to become) *specific intellectuals* who can, thereby, provide critical knowledge without posing as a master of single truth or of singular forms of justice. The specific intellectual is no universalist, but a contextually aware individual.

Anyhow, here are some ideational thirst-quenchers to help locate the fit of Foucault's ideas on governmentality and normalization to the geopolitics of tourism/tourism studies. Clearly, some of the concepts (like

'eye-of-authority', 'disciplinary mechanisms' or 'truth statements') that follow could have been placed under several other of the nine heuristic indicative classifications than the one accorded to them here. To repeat the point – the list is only intended to have illustrative value for *the beginner* who is treading these 'will-to-power'/'will-to-truth' conceptual waters about the governance of peoples, places and pasts. No reader should be in thrall to such a vulgar and undeveloped list. While 'there is nothing more dangerous than to reduce a philosophy . . . to a text-book formula' (as Bourdieu, 1984, stated in an immediate eulogy at Foucault's exit from the world), it is equally hazardous to reduce the subtle, complex and perverse political aesthetics of Foucault to a stand-alone or universalized 'glossary'. So this emergent glossary can only ever be a starting point on the journey to knowing of and about the naturalization or essentialization of things. Foucault always seemed to despise the very concept of *specialist knowledge* and repeatedly warned of the purblind manner in which expert/institutional 'opinion' tended to suppress alternative forms of intelligence, or alternative frames of reference (see Oksala, 2007: pp. 83–84).

#### **A. The original/larger list on 'knowledge'**

- Archaeology;
- Counter-narrative;
- Discursive knowledge\*;
- Interpretation;
- Narrative objectifications.

#### **▲ Reflexive critique 2: The interpretive force of discursive knowledge**

To Foucault, each institution, each discipline, each field uses 'languages' and 'knowledges' that have evolved over time, and supports classifications of the world that gradually/incrementally became naturalized and normalized. In this light, *all* languages and knowledges are appropriative, destabilizing discourses (towards other ways of seeing) and are thereby inherently 'violent', objectifying narratives.

#### **B. The original/larger list on 'governing'**

- Apparatus, the\*;
- Disciplinary society;
- Eye-of-authority\*;
- Foucauldian insight;
- Gaze, magisterial;
- Governmentality\*;
- Will-to-power.

#### **▲ Reflexive critique 3: The will-to-power undergirding each knowledge**

To Foucault, each institution, domain and organization constitutes a disciplinary society, and its favoured forms of discourse and praxis work to a will-to-power that dominates and suppresses other interpretations of the world. The governing gaze of those institutions works via their networked regimes of practice. These regimes have built up historically to comprise (where these institutions are strong) immense machines not just of domination but of the elimination of other outlooks on things. If an individual within such an institution/domain/organization is to transform things, he/she must fundamentally and regularly question how those things (of the now) came to be that way: such is the Foucauldian history of the present, and the history of the made self.

#### **C. The original/larger list on 'cumulative action'**

- Biopower;
- Capillary action\*;
- Historical meaning;
- Power-knowledge dyad, the;
- Subjugation;
- Unitary reason.

#### **▲ Reflexive critique 4: The capillary forces of unitary reason**

To Foucault, all knowledges, all worldviews and all philosophies impose favoured interpretations on the world as dominant forms of reason circulate in capillary fashion through the networked technology (or other, the politicized apparatus) that supports it. The

ethically/morally sound individual (to Foucault) is one who regularly/repeatedly seeks to understand how he/she has come to be 'that way' vis-à-vis his/her institutional and organizational life. If he/she is to transform things, then he/she must learn to ethically create himself/herself first, and learn to appreciate how/when/where he/she has been governed via the capillary force of 'dominant' or 'unitary' forms of reason.

#### **D. The original/larger list on 'the power of discourse/praxis'**

- Dominance;
- Eye-of-power;
- Gaze-clinical, the;
- Micro-power;
- Text;
- Unfreedom;
- Violence.

#### **▲ Reflexive critique 5: The everyday exercise of power-accumulating micro forms of 'talk' and 'deed'**

To Foucault, it is not the world that is represented through systems of representation, but it is those very systems of representation! The way in which the world is seen and projected constitutes a 'gaze' or 'eye-of-power' that serves as a mirror to these hailed visions of freedom and those coterminous held versions of unfreedom. To the later Foucault, the accidents of institutional history assign individuals their duties in the bodies/organizations/disciplines they work within as they exercise the inherited regimes of practice 'there'/'then', in seemingly 'petty' or 'micro' forms of 'talk' or 'activities'. But each man or woman can learn to develop his/her own *rapport à soi* moral/ethical character by understanding how he/she is being governed through the mundane everyday exercise of that 'reason'. Such is the art/skill/style of learning how to govern the self. Transformative power is not directly about fulfilling duties 'to others'; instead, it is the constant effort to appreciate how to govern and regulate the self.

#### **E. The original/larger list on 'complicitous seeing'**

- Disciplinary mechanisms\*;
- Panopticism;
- Scopic drive;
- Specular bias\*;
- Surveillance;
- Utterances;
- Visionary power.

#### **▲ Reflexive critique 6: Complications control through surveillance and self-surveillance**

In the estimation of Foucault – one of several lead anti-ocularists in the late 20th century – society has developed historically to unduly privilege visual perception (i.e. forms of looking/examining/photographing/exhibiting), which acts magisterially over people. Over time, particular visions become institutionally concretized, and they collaboratively/complicitously solidify into distinct institutional gazes. The morally/ethically sound individual is not so much he/she who knows 'the truth' that lies under or behind the ruling specular bias, but he/she who recognizes how and when he/she is acting in service to that scopic drive.

#### **F. The original/larger list on 'epistemic understanding'**

- Episteme/epistemic knowledge;
- Impensé;
- Tectonic inheritances;
- Truth statements\*;
- Unreason.

#### **▲ Reflexive critique 7: The paradigmatic framing and reframing of the world**

To Foucault, each society has been ruled by large and dominant epistemic (or paradigmatic) understandings, just as each institution has been ruled by favoured truth statements. Foucault's stylistics of existence requires the individual to know how to take care of the self in relation to such governing epistemes – to such dominant forms of reason. The goal in

and of life/work/service was not thereby to work towards a or any better truth to correct a or any episteme, for no absolutely improved or fully corrected order could or would ever be attainable – there would be ever only the onset of the next dominant episteme. The goal in life/work/service was to take care of oneself (to be one's own project), if one wanted to subsequently care for others.

#### **G. The original/larger list on 'the fabrication of truth'**

- Discourse;
- Games of truth;
- Micro-fascism;
- Praxis;
- Regime of truth\*;
- Truth;
- Will-to-truth.

#### **▲ Reflexive critique 8: All institutions engage in games of truth**

To Foucault, each and every body/organization/discipline has its own regimes of truth that are reflected in petty (i.e. mundane/everyday) ways via quotidian acts of 'talk' and 'deed'. Quite frequently these petty acts of discourse and praxis constitute unsuspected or undersuspected micro-fascist projections of being and becoming which version the world in that institutional bailiwick. Thus Foucauldian 'truth' is not that which is proven to be empirically justified, but that which is assumed there and then to be 'so'; it is an inherited and/or fabricated assumption which that body puts into service or promulgates in and across its domain of influence. While the early (archaeological) Foucault probed the rules of formation that historically gave rise to these fabrications, the later Foucault continued to uphold the Nietzschean view that no final all-purpose 'truth' could ever be reached on any subject. What interested Foucault – in his observations on the micro-physics of games of truth – was how institutions adopted strategies of power in projecting their preferred 'truths'. But such disciplinary use of 'power' was not always *negative*: the effects

could also be positive, and thereby subject to a multitude of competing interpretations. The aware and ethically alert individual who seeks to transform things must always remain alert to the highly interpretive and seductive character of a or any singular truth.

#### **H. The original/larger list on 'social/institutional production'**

- Carceral society;
- Institutional truth;
- Internal economy;
- Juridical space\*;
- Opaque power;
- Truth production.

#### **▲ Reflexive critique 9: Institutional truths can be carceral yet productive**

To Foucault, each institutional truth (or rather each episteme in which that truth was grounded) had an internal economy to which institutional members/communicators/agents were subject. Accordingly, these individuals could fast become conceptually imprisoned in that juridical space (i.e. in that realm of surveillance over particular 'things'). This power to normalize and naturalize that local or contextual world was deemed to be 'opaque' (or pre-assumed and hardly noticeable) by these institutional 'members'. The ethically alert individual who may wish to effect change in the world is thus (to the later Foucault) an agent who might best prosper if he/she recognized not only the historical and arbitrary nature of institutional truths (i.e. how 'we' and particularly 'I' came to be this way!), but the aforesaid 'positive' and not just 'negative' productive power latent within each and every one of them.

#### **I. The original/larger list on individual agency/ethics**

- Agents-of-normalcy;
- *Homo docilis*\*;
- *Practique de soi*;
- *Rapport à soi*\*;
- Self-regulation.

### ▲ Reflexive critique 10: Docile service in the governance of things

To Foucault, non-discursive formations (such as economic practices and disciplinary processes) produce discourses and then become 'organized' or 'said' through them. In the same light, individuals can fast be consanguine with that discourse (and its related praxis), as if they have been inserted into it. Where such effects were deemed to be strong, the individual (whether it be one who is the target of an institution's 'gaze', or indeed one charged with understanding that very gaze!) was said by Foucault to be 'docile' – and not readily 'aware' or easily 'capable' of collective courses of action. In his later years – following much external criticism – Foucault downplayed the impact of this supposed docility, and sought to cultivate much more consciousness (i.e. *rappor à soi*) regarding (particularly) how these agents of normalcy regulated themselves in their institutional service and their lives (i.e. in their *pratique de soi*). Hence, the early Foucault tends to be interpreted as a pessimistic philosopher whose *homo docilis* ('recipients' of normalcy and agents of normalcy) had little scope for different or transformative action, while the later Foucault was a more open philosopher who felt that ethically informed individuals could indeed transform the world if they first developed informed consciousness about their own positionalities in the tensions between institutional service and self-care, and indeed came to see their own lives as works of art in progress.

Clearly, the function of this pair of chapters is merely to open up those who work in tourism studies (and related fields) to Foucault's immense and original noetic theoretical vocabulary. It would simply be irresponsible to leave the impression that it is easy for any new and zealous critic (be he or she a constructivist, interpretivist, phenomenologist or other style of investigator) to work comfortably within the parameters of the 'magisterial gaze', '*homo docilis*' activity, '*impensé*' actions or whatever else, from the Foucauldian conceptual repertoire. Indeed, work along Foucault's lines of thought can fast lead over-keen Foucauldian disciples towards confidence that they have reached causal determinations of and about

things in the world, something which Foucault himself was never keen to entertain (Prado, 2000, p. 172), and too many hastily consumed doses of Foucault's conceptual elixir can lead social scientists in tourism studies (or in any domain or practice) towards understandings based on the over-fast perspective that individual human actors in the setting in question are really cultural dopes or gullible institutional idiots who are perpetually unable to make judgements for themselves (Watson, 1994) – or indeed to transform themselves or the world around them. For instance, in this light, Foucault's own early (1960s) heavy reliance upon his concept of an or the *episteme* has earned particular condemnation from critical theorists over recent decades, who view his approach as overly deterministic, and furthermore as irresponsible for so being, as it appears to evacuate human responsibility to work for positive change.

Table 4.1 – initially distilled from Merquior (1985) – now outlines some of the key drawbacks that can crop up in working within Foucault's 'archaeological' (historical philosophy) concept of epistemic understanding from that formative 1960s era. In his later writings, Foucault tended to reject much of his own early ('archaeological') reasoning, putting more weight in his notions of *discursive formations* (in his later 'genealogical' approaches) (Rouse, 1994) and of *rappor à soi* decision making (in the *pratique de soi* ethical approaches of his last decade of writing and reflection) (Davidson, 1994). It was not hard for Foucault himself to reason his own way out of such abstract minefields of external disapproval to his own clear satisfaction (Davidson, 1994), for he often merely claimed to be writing *guerrilla histories* that simply assessed things 'differently' (Prado, 2000, p. 166). While Foucault – as Hollinshead, Ivanova and Caton stated in Chapter 3 – saw the role of each of his books to be the extinction of his own previously published thinking (Eribon, 1991, p. 351), it is not so easy for the in-the-field researchers and practitioners (who thereafter, ironically, have to write under all sorts of institutional oversight in their own applied domains) to be so blasé about such sorts of external damnation of their work. Each on-the-ground researcher/practitioner in any applied field has to achieve cogency in his/her



**Table 4.1.** Weaknesses in Foucault's historical philosophy as is particularly revealed in his early (i.e. 'archaeological') reasoning. (From: Hollinshead, 1993, *The truth about Texas: A naturalistic study of the construction of heritage*. Collage Station, Texas. Texas A&M University [Department of R.P.T.S.]. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, p. 270, drawing from Merquior, 1985, pp. 56–75.)

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Seven delimiting aspects of Foucault's philosophical understandings

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- Foucault's presentation of epistemes is inclined to be *monolithic* – he overemphasizes the fit or place of *single epistemes* within any given age
  - Foucault's heavy reliance upon *unconnected* monolithic epistemes leads to the neglect of transepistemic thought and knowledge lines – he fails to recognize that some consciousness and some conceptualizations are multi-rooted
  - Foucault's insistence that epistemes come and go *all of a sudden* overlooks the *epistemic lags* that commonly occur with streams of thought – epistemes may be expected to have natural 'pioneers' and natural 'diehards' who extend the life-course of thought-lines
  - Foucault's tight explanation of epistemes fails to respect theories and knowledge that *return to conceptual popularity* after periods of disfavor – or which *undulate* in conceptual appeal over time
  - Foucault's neat search for patterns of understanding for, or within, given ages becomes (perhaps) a *search for epistemes*, per se – it is inclined to *overstress the force and acceptance* of some streams of thought and to raise them to the level of 'needed' epistemes
  - Foucault's resultant search for ordered/understandable/communicable epistemes also generates *intraepistemic* problems – he tends to under-account for *collapses* or *splinter effects* within epistemes
  - Foucault's resultant quest for solid/integrated/distinct epistemes is inclined to overlook the existence of *intraepistemic breaks* – he accentuates the discontinuities between epistemes, but under-profiles those *within* epistemes
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Notes: While these weaknesses pivot upon Foucault's condemned over-celebration of the concept of the epistemic (i.e. paradigmatic) break, other philosophers reject much Foucauldian thought because (i) his support for an interpretive infinity in things unacceptably abolishes the difference between sound or good moral or ethical action (in the general sense of the terms 'morals' and 'ethics'); (ii) he denied the authenticity of empirical/scientific 'truth', yet still frequently relied on detached objectivist truths himself; (iii) his work was just too sweeping, idiosyncratic and authoritarian in and of itself; and (iv) its lack of support for a or any better future was thwartive and defeatist. For a simple read on the contradictions within Foucauldian thought, newcomers to Foucault's conceptions are encouraged to inspect Horrocks and Jevtic (2009).

investigative efforts under the shadow of all sorts of ongoing inspection and all kinds of 'practice-driven' mentalities – the very kind of thing that tended to raise the intellectual ire of the strong-minded Foucault in the first place. Such individual researchers must, therefore, take on board the sorts of small 'warnings' and large 'condemnations' that anti-Foucault specialists like Merquior (1985) yield up – as given here in Table 4.1 in terms of Foucault's archaeological (early) work on epistemes. Yet, the peril remains that if Foucault's work is too readily dismissed as mere 'essay-work', then the conceptual baby (of and about the governmentality of things) will be thrown out with the bath water. The social sciences – in all domains – simply need considered application and considered interpretation of the myriad new ways Foucault has taught us to see what we politically and

all-too-unsuspectingly do when we sit together in our normalizing institutions, and to examine what we do politically and all-too-trustingly when we take on board classifications of peoples, places and pasts which have come to us naturalized and 'already formulated'. And so when, in tourism management and tourism development, we actively seek to transform a destination or a place, how imaginative have we been in exploring opportunities for new ways of seeing places, for linking in that destination with new fields of experience or for encouraging new local ways of life to flourish there through tourism? Have we indeed engaged in any *rapport à soi* to determine *our own individual positionality* in relation to the regimes of truth (i.e. the games of truth) we have conceivably been upholding in the past? Have we been merely *docile* and *contained* within and by the

power/knowledge networks that have historically positioned the said place/destination, or have we indeed thought towards what has been industrially (within tourism) 'unimaginable'? Whose interests do the new projections of place and space continue to privilege, and whose rights, lifestyles and inheritances have we in contrast encouraged and empowered? How collaborative and coercive have we been – and about what in whose interests? When we transform our visitable destinations and reposition our projected places, have we really engaged in transformative thinking, or have we actually stayed unreflectively within old and established economies of knowledge? And as we work within the regimes of management and research practice that we inhabit and as we place make, place remake and place demake, how critically aware have we been of the ontological effects we have had on the multiplicity of different populations in and around that locale? Have we transformed any *different futures* or transformed any *future differently* – or are we only indulging in surface transformations, which continue to bolster the beneficiaries of old? Is it indeed time for more robust *counter-conduct* (Rabinow and Foucault, 1997, p. 202) of some corrective kind?

Since, in the business of tourism, the whole world is continually being classified, continually being represented and continually being projected as a matter of everyday intercourse and discourse, we are duty bound in management and in research to take regular heed from the sorts of circumspections and vigilances that Foucault has potently drawn our attention to. We in tourism management and we in tourism studies are playing our banal and collective part in making some things dominant each and every day, in each and every place: and 'we' are always dealing in petty and opaque Foucauldian actions which suppress/subjugate/silence other things (be they other peoples, other places, other pasts) every time we work, every time we think and every time we do not think. If Foucault has anything to say to 'us' in tourism studies (or in any other institutional thought-dom), it is to operate with much less axiomatic trust in what we have been told is so about the world around us. We must all regularly and routinely be alive to the inevitability of doxa and representational repertoires being routinely

carried within our inherited understandings about the normalized and naturalized geopolitical world. What is given to us by past researchers, by those in what one could call 'parental fields' like history, geography, anthropology, whatever, or by performative specialists in other fields like film, media and heritage projection has already been subject to all manner of nurturing within the cultural and institutional war-rants of other institutional demesnes. Clearly, we have to accept so much in trust from these other past and present players in the games of governmentality that we are inevitably thereby drawn into. But at least we can each learn to be watchful over our own internal economies of representation and subjectification (i.e. over the internalization of what governs us). Whether those who work in tourism management and tourism studies like it or not, we each serve as primary political-in-effect classifiers of and about the world. We work day in and day out to register, to label, to signpost and to version the world. Such banal governance is indeed unavoidable: it is like breathing. We must turn such vital self-rapport inspections of our own everyday governmentalities into a self-vigilant work of art – without drowning ourselves in the quicksands of constant reflexivity.

So, in terms of this critical craft of self-rapport, we are damned if we do not do it, but are equally damned if we do indeed do it. The people makers, place makers, past makers and present makers of the governing realm of 'tourism' have to learn how to temper organizational and project work with well-crafted and regular self-vigilance without letting these quicksands of reflexivity suffocate our very labours. We might work in tourism management and tourism studies to transform our destinations and better the lot of some place-holders and guardians of legend, myth and nature, but we must learn from Foucault that we will inevitably be repressing others through that very transformation-seeking activity, and that folks and practitioners of a later age will be bewildered as to why (today) we just could not see things differently, properly and as they should have been seen all along, in accordance with their own (future) epistemes! Perhaps Foucault – if he had thought or instructed on courses and 'the governmentality of tourism' itself – would have constantly reminded us that games of transformation are



zero-sum games. No transformative projection or refabrication in tourism can ever metamorphose things wonderfully to the happy satisfaction of all the interest groups or all the guardians of local custom, viewable culture and visitable nature. The culture gene bank, the heritage gene bank and the nature gene bank of every place and space are each highly interpretable and dynamically interpretable things. The geopolitics of the governmentality of destination development and host community projection will always be multi-perspectival and thereby also always inevitably political.

What Foucault aims to instruct is that if an individual seeks to transform the world, he/she must first studiously examine his/her own work and life in relation to the institutional truths he/she is quietly/undersuspectingly projecting, the organizational interpretations he/she is quietly/undersuspectingly peddling and the life values he/she is quietly/undersuspectingly performing. This inner life recognition was recently summarized in a national newspaper in the UK by Giles Fraser, a priest in charge of St. Mary's Church, Newington (South London), although the inner philosophical spirituality he is fascinated by is not demonstrably Christian in its reach. While Fraser had himself been inspired by a dog-eared copy of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* rather than by any of Foucault's own works, the point registered by Fraser is highly

germane to the *pratique de soi* commentaries of 'The Great Subversive' (Foucault), himself:

Philosophy is not about building intellectual foundations so much as creating better intellectual maps that reflect what people are doing when they say the things they do. Philosophers are not intellectual referees, arrogantly declaring certain ideas offside; they are more like therapists, trying to work out how muddles are created and how they can be undone. For both therapists and Wittgensteinian philosophers [and self-regulating Foucauldian 'transformers'!], attention is properly directed on what one does, [and] how meaning is indexed to behaviour. Neither discipline is about the clever answers one can provide under cross-examination.

(Fraser, 2013)

So, if tourism is to transform the world, we do need to cultivate more therapists in tourism management and tourism studies who first inspect and heal the everyday values that are at play. The transformation of the world through tourism – not unlike the transformation of any muddled/messy/highly contested sphere – requires, above all, self-aware philosophical 'healers' who can help us to teach ourselves how to spiritually and aesthetically heal ourselves first. Even in tourism and travel, the transformation of the world begins at home.

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## **Part III**

# **Where is the Host?**

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zero-sum games. No transformative projection or refabrication in tourism can ever metamorphose things wonderfully to the happy satisfaction of all the interest groups or all the guardians of local custom, viewable culture and visitable nature. The culture gene bank, the heritage gene bank and the nature gene bank of every place and space are each highly interpretable and dynamically interpretable things. The geopolitics of the governmentality of destination development and host community projection will always be multi-perspectival and thereby also always inevitably political.

What Foucault aims to instruct is that if an individual seeks to transform the world, he/she must first studiously examine his/her own work and life in relation to the institutional truths he/she is quietly/undersuspectingly projecting, the organizational interpretations he/she is quietly/undersuspectingly peddling and the life values he/she is quietly/undersuspectingly performing. This inner life recognition was recently summarized in a national newspaper in the UK by Giles Fraser, a priest in charge of St. Mary's Church, Newington (South London), although the inner philosophical spirituality he is fascinated by is not demonstrably Christian in its reach. While Fraser had himself been inspired by a dog-eared copy of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* rather than by any of Foucault's own works, the point registered by Fraser is highly

germane to the *pratique de soi* commentaries of 'The Great Subversive' (Foucault), himself:

Philosophy is not about building intellectual foundations so much as creating better intellectual maps that reflect what people are doing when they say the things they do. Philosophers are not intellectual referees, arrogantly declaring certain ideas offside; they are more like therapists, trying to work out how muddles are created and how they can be undone. For both therapists and Wittgensteinian philosophers [and self-regulating Foucauldian 'transformers'!], attention is properly directed on what one does, [and] how meaning is indexed to behaviour. Neither discipline is about the clever answers one can provide under cross-examination.

(Fraser, 2013)

So, if tourism is to transform the world, we do need to cultivate more therapists in tourism management and tourism studies who first inspect and heal the everyday values that are at play. The transformation of the world through tourism – not unlike the transformation of any muddled/messy/highly contested sphere – requires, above all, self-aware philosophical 'healers' who can help us to teach ourselves how to spiritually and aesthetically heal ourselves first. Even in tourism and travel, the transformation of the world begins at home.

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